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INTRODUCTION
The Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007
(FDAAA) grants the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) authority to
require a Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy (REMS) from drug
manufacturers to ensure that a certain drug’s benefits outweigh its risks.1
Through REMS, the FDA restricts the distribution of drugs with
dangerous characteristics, such as high toxicities and severe side effects,
to qualified medical professionals.2 Such restrictions limit the ability of
generic drug manufacturers to obtain samples of the REMS-restricted
drugs for bioequivalence testing for an Abbreviated New Drug
Application (ANDA).3 Without the ability to demonstrate
bioequivalence in the ANDAs, potential generic entrants are unable to
obtain FDA approval of drugs that would eventually compete with the
REMS drugs.4 Recently, potential generic entrants have attempted to use
the antitrust laws to force manufacturers of REMS-restricted drugs to
provide them with samples.5 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has
weighed in on behalf of generic entry.6
The FTC’s recent actions are consistent with its long-standing policy
concern regarding restrictions that limit generic drug competition. The
FTC’s actions demonstrate its belief that generic entry in the
pharmaceutical market will create positive consumer welfare effects.7
The consumer welfare effects of such generic competition, however, are
more complex than merely lowered prices. Indeed, the FTC has
downplayed evidence that generic entry restricts drug utilization, chills
industry investment, and may have unintended health and safety
consequences.8 Yet, the FTC has continued unabatedly down the path to
1. SUSAN THAUL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41983, HOW FDA APPROVES DRUGS AND
REGULATES THEIR SAFETY AND EFFECTIVENESS 15–16 (2012).
2. Id.
3. David Rodi & Zach Hughes, Are Branded Manufacturers Obligated to Sell Their
Drugs to Generic Manufacturers So They Can Make Copies?, BAKER BOTTS LLP (Feb.
28, 2012), http://www.bakerbotts.com/file_upload/Update_2012_02LifeSciencesNewsletter
BrandedManufacturers.htm.
4. See id.
5. See, e.g., Complaint at 4, Mylan Pharm. Inc. v. Celgene Corp., No. 2:14-CV-2094
(D.N.J. Apr. 3, 2014) [hereinafter Mylan Complaint]; Complaint for Declaratory Judgment at 7–
8, Actelion Pharm. Ltd. v. Apotex Inc., No. 1:12-cv-05743-NLH-AMD (D.N.J. Sept. 14, 2012)
[hereinafter Actelion Complaint].
6. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n Brief as Amicus Curiae at 2, Mylan, No. 2:14-CV-2094ES-MAH, available at http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/amicus_briefs/mylanpharmaceuticals-inc.v.celgene-corporation/140617celgeneamicusbrief.pdf [hereinafter FTC
Mylan Brief]; Fed. Trade Comm’n Brief as Amicus Curiae at 2, Actelion, No. 1:12-cv-05743NLH-AMD [hereinafter FTC Actelion Brief].
7. Mylan Complaint, supra note 5, at 2–3; Actelion Complaint, supra note 5, at 1–2.
8. See Tracy Lewis et. al., Does Generic Entry Always Increase Consumer Welfare?,
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generic drug nirvana, asserting that new entry by generics produces
unambiguously positive effects for consumers.
The FTC’s recent intervention on behalf of generic manufacturers
that attempt to use federal antitrust laws to gain access to REMSrestricted drugs overlaps with the FDA’s direct oversight of REMSrestricted drugs. So long as original-brand manufacturing companies
(brand manufacturers) have unanswered questions related to their
liability for the actions of generic companies, they are unwilling to
provide potential competitors with product samples, as there is no valid
business justification to give up those samples.9 Rather, REMSrestricted drug makers have many valid business justifications for their
refusal to deal with a potential generic manufacturer. This ongoing
dispute has spurred private litigation and an FTC investigation.10 In two
private litigation cases, the FTC filed amicus briefs claiming that the
antitrust claims under section 2 of the Sherman Act are cognizable and
that the court should determine the merits of the claim.11 To date, no
court has addressed the merits of these antitrust claims and details of the
FTC’s investigation are unclear.12
This Article provides an antitrust and economic analysis of a refusalto-deal claim in the REMS context. The analysis suggests that the
antitrust claims involved do not provide a proper justification for a new
exception to a competitor’s right to refuse to deal. The FDA and
Congress play important roles in the complex regulatory scheme of the
U.S. pharmaceutical industry. With so much regulation and oversight,
antitrust has little place in ensuring an efficiently functioning market for
REMS-restricted pharmaceuticals.
Part I provides background about generic drug entry under the Hatch–
Waxman Act, which lays out the framework for ANDAs, and discusses
REMS-restricted drugs under the FDAAA. This Part also details current
antitrust litigation stemming from refusal to deal in the REMS context,
as well as the FTC’s position on such conduct. Part II summarizes the
antitrust refusal-to-deal doctrine under section 2 of the Sherman Act by
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 373, 381 (2012); Laura E. Panattoni, The Effect of Paragraph IV Decisions
and Generic Entry Before Patent Expiration on Brand Pharmaceutical Firms, 30 J. HEALTH
ECON. 126, 144 (2011); Rodi & Hughes, supra note 3.
9. See, e.g., Rodi & Hughes, supra note 3 (noting a warning that giving samples “to
generic manufacturers would impose undue . . . risks on [an] innovator company”).
10. FTC Mylan Brief, supra note 6, at 2; FTC Actelion Brief, supra note 6, at 3.
11. FTC Mylan Brief, supra note 6, at 8; FTC Actelion Brief, supra note 6, at 8.
12. See Kurt R. Karst, Decision in Lannett THALOMID Bioequivalence Study Sample
Antitrust Lawsuit Could Reignite Debate on Generic Drug Availability and REMS Restrictions,
FDA LAW BLOG (Apr. 3, 2011, 10:21 PM), http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog_hyman_
phelps/2011/04/decision-in-lannett-thalomid-bioequivalence-study-sample-antitrust-lawsuitcould-reignite-debate-on-.html [hereinafter Karst, Decision in Lannett]; Rodi & Zach Hughes,
supra note 3.
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analyzing prior U.S. Supreme Court precedent. This Part then argues that
refusal-to-deal claims in the REMS context fail under current refusal-todeal jurisprudence. Part III argues that given the error costs associated
with antitrust or agency intervention, such intervention would be
contrary to public policy. Part IV suggests a narrow antitrust framework
to analyze refusal to deal in the REMS context if the courts determine
that antitrust analysis is appropriate. If the refusal to provide samples of
REMS-restricted drugs to competitors does receive antitrust scrutiny, it
should be evaluated under the profit-sacrifice test. Analysis under other
theories of antitrust liability would be imprudent.
I. GENERIC DRUG APPLICATIONS, REMS-RESTRICTED DRUGS, AND
ANTITRUST CLAIMS
The Hatch–Waxman Act provides an avenue and incentive for
generic drug manufacturers to develop competitor drugs to brand-name
drugs and enter the pharmaceutical market.13 This Part begins by
detailing how the Hatch–Waxman Act incentivizes generic entry. The
Part then outlines the complications that arise when generic drug
manufacturers seek to develop generics for REMS-restricted drugs.
Finally, it explains the antitrust claims by some generic drug
manufacturers and the FTC regarding refusal-to-deal conduct in the
REMS context.
A. The Hatch–Waxman Act Enhances Generic Entry
The Hatch–Waxman Act lays out the regulatory structure for
pharmaceutical patent protection and the development of generic
alternatives to brand-name drugs.14 Congress created the Hatch–
Waxman Act as a mechanism to accelerate the entry of lower cost
generic drugs into the pharmaceutical market,15 and it has certainly had
that effect.16 The Hatch–Waxman Act allows FDA approval of generic
versions of drugs through an ANDA, which is markedly cheaper and
quicker than the approval of the original brand-name drugs through a
New Drug Application (NDA).17 Approval of generic versions of drugs
13. The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2012)).
14. Id.
15. See id.; FTC Actelion Brief, supra note 6, at 5.
16. Roxane, a generic drug manufacturer, points to an IMS Health Study from 2009 finding
that generic prescription drugs saved the U.S. health care system more than $800 billion from
2000 to 2009. Roxane Laboratories, Inc.’s Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and Counterclaim
Complaint at 28, Actelion Pharm. Ltd. v. Apotex Inc., No. 1:12-cv-05743-NLH-AMD (D.N.J.
Nov. 27, 2012) [hereinafter Roxane Counterclaim].
17. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2), (j).
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requires only a showing of bioequivalence,18 which is considered an AB
rating if the generic “contains the same active pharmaceutical ingredient
as the brand-name drug, [has] the same dosage and form, and exhibits a
similar . . . absorption.”19
This process of generic drug approval ensures that these
pharmaceuticals “share the same safety and efficacy profile as their
brand counterparts.”20 In return for the heightened generic competition,
brand manufacturers receive a longer patent term.21 The Hatch–Waxman
Act also makes it easier for generic manufacturers to declare their
intention to enter a market—even when a brand-name drug is covered
by a patent—merely by filing a certification claiming that the patent is
invalid or the generic version is non-infringing (this is known as a
paragraph IV certification).22 The Hatch–Waxman Act thus places the
onus of protecting the patent on the patent holder.
B. REMS-Restricted Drugs Under the FDA Amendments Act
Under the FDAAA, REMS restrictions protect patients by limiting
the distribution of dangerous drugs and ensuring that certain safety
standards regulate their use.23 REMSs represent a very visible regulatory
scheme designed to have a measured and incrementally increasing list of
safety restrictions to ensure a uniform approach to concerns over drugs
that have already been approved by the FDA and released for public
use.24 The FDAAA gives the FDA authority to require REMSs for new
and previously approved drugs “to ensure the benefits . . . outweigh the
risks of the drug.”25
The system is designed to create a more uniform approach to potential
side effects and health risks posed by already released drugs.26 The FDA
is now tasked with determining if each newly released drug should be
accompanied by one of many different kinds of REMSs.27 These
restrictions are designed to ensure the safe administration of drugs to
healthcare practitioners and patients, as well as provide more detailed
18. See id. § 355(j)(8).
19. FTC Actelion Brief, supra note 6, at 3–4.
20. FTC Actelion Brief, supra note 6, at 4.
21. The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98417, 98 Stat. 1598 (1984) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2012)).
22. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(E)(ii), (j)(5)(F)(ii).
23. R. William Soller & Eleanor M. Vogt, The REMS Primer: Understanding the
Strategies for Risk Management, MEDSCAPE EDUCATION FAMILY MEDICINE (Dec. 28, 2010),
http://www.medscape.org/viewarticle/734712.
24. Id.
25. See Roxane Counterclaim, supra note 16, at 27.
26. See Soller & Vogt, supra note 23.
27. Id.
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and comprehensive data for post-marketing studies of rare but serious
side effects or reactions.28 The REMS restrictions are specific to
individual drugs, and no two REMS programs are necessarily alike.29
REMS restrictions may include any of the following categories: “a
medication guide or patient package-insert requirement, a
communication plan, . . . [a] timetable for sponsor submission to FDA
of an assessment on the impact of a REMS program,” or detailed
“elements to assure safe use (ETASU).”30
REMS restrictions can significantly curtail a drug’s availability
because REMS-restricted drugs are only available for purchase from the
manufacturer rather than through normal distribution channels, such as
wholesalers.31 REMS restrictions can result in similar availability issues
for generic manufacturers that require testable samples in order to
produce bioequivalent drugs.32 Even those REMS-restricted drugs that
are sold by distributors are often subject to restrictive agreements that
further limit a generic manufacturer’s ability to access samples.33
The regulatory regime established by the FDAAA does not explicitly
require brand manufacturers to provide product samples to generic
manufacturers.34 Congress did consider draft language creating this
obligation, but did not include it in the final version of the amendment.35
28. FDA Basics Webinar: A Brief Overview of Risk Evaluation & Mitigation Strategies
(REMS), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/Transparency/Basics/
ucm325201.htm (last visited May 1, 2015).
29. Id.
30. Soller & Vogt, supra note 23. For instance, a REMS restriction for a drug that could
cause birth defects might require a negative pregnancy test before the drug could be prescribed.
31. See Roxane Counterclaim, supra note 16, at 22.
32. Id.
33. See, e.g., id. A related issue involves the patenting of a REMS plan. Patented REMS
plans can be listed with the FDA’s “Orange Book” and can substantially extend the life of an
already-patented drug. Laura S. Shores, Pharmaceutical Patent Life Extension Strategies: Are
REMS Programs Next?, PEPPER HAMILTON LLP (Mar. 28, 2012), http://www.pepperlaw.com/
publications_article.aspx?ArticleKey=2335. Another hurdle created by REMS patents is that
their administration can be labor intensive. Celgene Corporation patented a distribution program
called S.T.E.P.S. for the drug Thalomid that requires 175 employees to implement. Id. The
difficulty in administration could exclude the majority of smaller generic manufacturers.
Although not a part of the current disputes over refusals to provide samples, this conduct is a
likely candidate for future disputes and possible enforcement actions by the FTC. These patents
can be challenged similarly to brand-name pharmaceuticals by filing “Paragraph IV
certifications.” Id.
34. Rodi & Hughes, supra note 3.
35. Kurt R. Karst, Actelion Preemptively Sues Generic Companies over REMS and Biostudy
Product Availability Issues; Case Could Be a Bellwether for Future Efforts, FDA LAW BLOG (Oct.
9, 2012), http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/2012/10/ actelion-preemptivelysues-generic-companies-over-rems-and-biostudy-product-availability-issues-case.html [hereinafter
Karst, Actelion Preemptively Sues].
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Congress even had a second opportunity to include this language in 2012
when it passed the FDA Safety and Innovation Act (FDASIA), and again
chose not to make sharing drug samples mandatory.36 Current regulatory
law does include an ambiguous statement that brand manufacturers
should not use ETASU “to block or delay approval of an [ANDA].”37
The interpretation of this requirement will be up to the courts, but it
seems to fall far short of imposing an obligation on brand manufacturers
to deal with their rivals.38
The FDA has been slow to clarify its stance on whether brand
manufacturers should have a duty to deal with potential generic
competitors, but it has included language in REMS approval letters
reiterating that brand manufacturers cannot use ETASU “to block or
delay approval of an [ANDA].”39 The FDA has referred generic
manufacturers’ complaints about the anticompetitive effects of these
refusals to the FTC.40
The overall regulatory problem in these cases is the result of
unresolved interest-group battles between generic and brand
manufacturing companies.41 A promising compromise would have
imposed a statutory obligation for brand manufacturers to provide
samples of their drugs for bioequivalency testing, and in return, would
have given them protection from liability for any mistakes, adverse
events, or harmful payments that could arise from use of the samples or
the resulting generic products.42 However, such a compromise collapsed,
36. The original draft of the FDASIA stated that “if a drug is a covered drug, no elements
to ensure safe use shall prohibit, or be construed or applied to prohibit, supply of such drug to
any eligible drug developer for the purpose of conducting testing necessary to support an
application under [FDC Act § (b)(2) or § 505(j) or PHS Act § 351(k)].” Id.; Food and Drug
Administration Safety and Innovation Act, S. 3187, 112th Cong. § 1131 (2012); 158 Cong. Rec.
S3371 (2012).
37. 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(f)(8) (2012).
38. Karst, Actelion Preemptively Sues, supra note 35.
39. See, e.g., Letter from Judith A. Racoosin, Deputy Dir. for Safety, Ctr. for Drug
Evaluation & Research, to Beth Connelly, Assoc. Dir. Regulatory Affairs, Purdue Pharma L.P.
(Apr. 15, 2013) available at http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/appletter/2013/
019516Orig1s038ltr.pdf.
40. See Letter from Janet Woodcock, Dir., Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Research, to Kumar
Sekar, Dr. Reddy’s Labs., Inc. (Aug. 7, 2013), available at http://www.fdalawyersblog.com/
FDA_CDER_to_Dr_Reddys_Laboratories_Inc_Partial_Petition_Approval_and_Denial.pdf.
41. Merrill Goozner, Rx Firms Use Safety Scare Tactics to Thwart Generics, THE FISCAL
TIMES (June 15, 2012), http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2012/06/15/RX-Firms-UseSafety-Scare-Tactics-to-Thwart-Generics#sthash.xJG8jjG5.dpuf (“Efforts to close the
loophole,” which allows brand manufactures to avoid giving REMS-restricted drug samples to
generic manufacturers, “have become the subject of a fierce behind-the-scenes lobbying
campaign on rival bills that reauthorize industry user fees”).
42. See Goozner, supra note 41.
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and the resulting regulatory scheme and brand manufacturers’ liability
issues remain unclear and muddled.
C. REMS Antitrust Claims
After the FDAAA became law in 2007, conflicts over the
implementation of REMSs started almost immediately. Brand
manufacturers began refusing to provide samples of brand-name drugs
to generic manufacturers, who previously had access to these drugs for
the bioequivalence testing required for the development of generic
alternatives under the Hatch–Waxman Act.43 Despite formal requests,
protests, demands, and threats of litigation, brand manufacturers have
asserted their right to refuse to sell their patented drugs to generic
manufacturers while the generic manufacturers have complained of both
regulatory and antitrust violations.44 The FTC is conducting at least one
investigation into the practice, and three high-profile cases deserve
closer analysis.45
1. Lannett Co. v. Celgene Corp.
In 2008, Lannett Co. (Lannett), a generic manufacturer, sued Celgene
Corp. (Celgene), a brand manufacturer46 in Lannett Co. v. Celgene
Corp.47 Lannett alleged that Celgene was restricting Lannett’s access to
the drug Thalomid (thalidomide), which is subject to some of the strictest
REMS restrictions, to prevent bioequivalence testing for a proposed
ANDA.48
Celgene asserted that it would not consider providing the drug
samples until it received proof from the study’s sponsor or the FDA that
43. See FTC Mylan Brief, supra note 6, at 3–4; FTC Actelion Brief, supra note 6, at 3–4.
44. See, e.g., FTC Mylan Brief, supra note 6, at 14; FTC Actelion Brief, supra note 6, at
15.
45. Similar conduct has arisen in other cases. For example, Acorda Therapeutics has
refused to sell samples of the brand-name drug Ampyra. Contention in Making Generic Drugs,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/04/15/business/
Contention-in-Making-Generic-Drugs.html. Ampyra is administered to improve walking in
patients suffering from multiple sclerosis and had sales of over $250 million in the United States
in 2012. Id. Accord Healthcare, a generic manufacturer, has sued in federal court with claims
similar to those in Actelion and Lannett. Katie Thomas, Drug Makers Use Safety Rule to Block
Generics, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/16/business/drugmakers-use-safety-rule-to-block-generics.html [hereinafter Thomas, Drug Makers Use Safety].
Another brand manufacturer, Lundbeck, has refused to sell drug samples of Xenazine, a drug
used to treat a movement disorder caused by Huntington’s disease, to Apotex. Id. Lundbeck
claims that it is waiting for the FDA’s guidance. Id.
46. Rodi & Hughes, supra note 3.
47. Lannett Co. v. Celgene Corp., No. 08-3920, 2011 WL 1193912 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 29,
2011).
48. Id. at *1; Karst, Decision in Lannett, supra note 12; Rodi & Hughes, supra note 3.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016

9

Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 3 [2016], Art. 1

986

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

the study would comply with the REMS requirements and would not
jeopardize the test subjects’ safety.49 The court initially dismissed the
complaint on “ripeness grounds” because the study had not yet received
approval from the FDA.50 Lannett then received FDA approval and
refiled the case; the court denied Celgene’s subsequent motion to
dismiss.51 Before the merits of the antitrust and regulatory claims were
decided, the parties initially settled with a confidential agreement.52
The FDA did not take a strong enough position to quell the ensuing
litigation.53 The FDA filed a letter stating that Lannett could access the
necessary drugs once the company received approval for its
bioequivalence study, but the FDA did not require Celgene to provide
the requested samples.54 The Lannett case represents the first time the
FTC became actively involved in an investigation of this type of
behavior, but the result of the investigation is unknown.55
2. Actelion Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Apotex Inc.
In Actelion Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc.,56 Actelion
Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (Actelion), a brand manufacturer, refused to
provide generic manufacturers with samples of the REMS-restricted
drugs Tracleer (generic name bosentan) and Zavesca (generic name
miglustat).57Actelion argued that its position was consistent with both
the REMS regulatory requirements and its own assertion that the
company lacked any statutory or legal obligation to deal with potential

49. Lannett, 2011 WL 1193912, at *1; Karst, Decision in Lannett, supra note 12.
50. Karst, Decision in Lannett, supra note 12.
51. Id.
52. Erin Coe, Lannett Cuts Deal with Celgene in Thalomid Antitrust Case, LAW360 (Dec.
7, 2011, 2:47 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/291483/lannett-cuts-deal-with-celgene-inthalomid-antitrust-case; see also Lannett, 2011 WL 1193912, at *3.
53. See Letter from Janet Woodcock, supra note 40 (noting that the FDA: (1) agreed that
it should clarify the relationship between bioequivalence studies and REMS; (2) recognized that
many bioequivalence tests do not violate REMS; (3) declined to add into the REMS a
requirement to provide samples to generics; and (4) agreed that it will refer some cases to the
FTC or open its own investigation if there are competitive concerns).
54. Rodi & Hughes, supra note 3.
55. Id. Note that Celgene’s SEC filings from 2009 to 2012 state that it received two civil
investigation demands from the FTC so the current status of this investigation is unclear. Id.
56. No. 1:12-cv-05743-NLH-AMD (D.N.J. Sept. 14, 2012).
57. Actelion Complaint, supra note 5, at 2; Kurt R. Karst, Actelion’s Preemptive Strike
over REMS and Biostudy Product Availability Draws Antitrust Counterclaims, Another Drug,
and Another Company into the Mix, FDA LAW BLOG (Dec. 5, 2012, 5:57 PM),
http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/2012/12/actelions-preemptive-strikeover-rems-and-biostudy-product-availability-draws-antitrust-counterclaim.html
[hereinafter
Karst, Actelion’s Preemptive Strike].
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competitors.58 Actelion claimed that the REMS restrictions only allowed
Tracleer to “be dispensed through pharmacies, practitioners, and health
care settings that [were] specially certified and bound by contract to
follow a strict protocol to monitor and protect patient health.”59 The
restrictions further require
monthly follow-up[s] with patients to ensure that liver
function testing and pregnancy testing have been
completed; that only a limited supply of Tracleer can be
distributed at a time; that Tracleer can only be dispensed to
patients who are enrolled in the REMS program; and that
certain defined patient counseling is completed regularly.60
Actelion’s actions prevented generic manufacturers Roxane
Laboratories Inc. (Roxane) and Apotex Inc. (Apotex) from moving
forward with ANDAs for generic versions of Tracleer and Zavesca. 61 As
a result, Actelion was able to delay the development and entry of generic
versions into the market, which may prevent price-lowering competition
and access to cheaper versions of these two drugs for consumers.62
Actelion pointed to the REMS restrictions associated with the serious
side effects of Tracleer as a justification for limiting distribution to its
competitors.63 Side effects for the use of Tracleer include serious liver
damage, liver failure, and birth defects if taken during pregnancy.64
Apotex sent letters to Actelion making clear its intention to begin an
ANDA filing for a generic form of Tracleer.65 Actelion responded with
a formal denial, asserting its right to refuse to deal with a rival.66 The
same denial indicated that the REMS requirements prevented release of
any samples without proof that Apotex’s bioequivalence study protocol,
required under the Hatch–Waxman Act to develop a generic
pharmaceutical, complied with the REMS requirements.67

58. Actelion Complaint, supra note 5, at 2–3.
59. Id. at 6.
60. Id.
61. Karst, Actelion’s Preemptive Strike, supra note 57. One interesting twist in the case
was that Apotex managed to procure a Canadian version of the drug for bioequivalence testing,
but the FDA denied the use of this sample in a correspondence claiming that Apotex could only
use “the approved US product as the reference product” and that the Canadian version was “not
acceptable to use.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
62. See id.
63. Actelion Complaint, supra note 5, at 6.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 7.
66. Id. at 10.
67. Id. at 9–10, 13–14.
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Roxane similarly made multiple attempts to purchase the samples and
was met with refusals.68 It also received similar responses from
Actelion’s U.S. supplier, CuraScript.69 On November 9, 2011, Actelion
sent Roxane a definitive notification that it asserted a right to choose
with whom it would deal and that it would not sell samples to Roxane.70
Roxane then contended that the REMS restrictions were being used to
“block or delay approval” of ANDAs in contravention of the FDA’s antigaming provisions.71 Roxane continued that Actelion’s responses were
“nothing more than an anticompetitive scheme calculated to delay
generic competition as long as possible.”72 In response, Actelion asserted
that declining to provide samples of its drugs fit squarely within its right
to refuse to deal with actual or potential rivals.73 Actelion’s position was
that it maintained proprietary control over its own patented drugs and
owed no legal or regulatory obligation to provide samples to generic
manufacturers.74
Eventually, Actelion filed for declaratory judgment in the U.S.
District Court for the District of New Jersey, seeking a court order
affirming its right to refuse to deal with any potential rivals.75 Both
Apotex and Roxane brought counterclaims asserting that Actelion
violated the New Jersey Antitrust Act and sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Antitrust Act and also committed tortious interference; they
sought treble damages and injunctive relief. 76 Another generic
manufacturer, Actavis Elizabeth LLC (Actavis), tried to intervene as a
similarly aggrieved generic manufacturer.77 Actavis’s Proposed
Counterclaim made similar legal claims, including violations of the
Sherman Act and the New Jersey Antitrust Act.78 The FTC filed an
amicus brief in this case arguing that current antitrust law supports
reaching the merits of the arguments.79

68. Id. at 9.
69. Roxane Counterclaim, supra note 16, at 35.
70. Id. at 35–36.
71. See id. at 23.
72. Id. at 39.
73. Id. at 58.
74. Stewart Bishop, Actelion Says Antitrust Law Can’t Make It Sell to Rivals, LAW360
(Jan. 17, 2013, 2:41 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/408041/actelion-says-antitrust-lawcan-t-make-it-sell-to-rivals.
75. Karst, Actelion Preemptively Sues, supra note 35.
76. See Roxane Counterclaim, supra note 16, at 53.
77. Karst, Actelion’s Preemptive Strike, supra note 57.
78. Id.
79. FTC Actelion Brief, supra note 6, at 17.
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3. Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Celgene Corp.
Most recently, the FTC submitted a second REMS-related amicus
brief80 to the District Court of New Jersey in Mylan Pharmaceuticals
Inc. v. Celgene Corp.81 In that case, Mylan Pharmaceuticals (Mylan)
sued Celgene alleging that Celgene’s conduct relating to REMSrestricted drugs violated federal and state antitrust laws.82 Specifically,
Mylan, a generic manufacturer, charged that Celgene, a brand
manufacturer, was using the REMS restrictions on its drugs—Thalomid
and Revlimid (lenalidomide)—as a pretext for refusing to provide Mylan
with samples of these drugs.83 Mylan further alleged that, due to
distribution restrictions put in place by Celgene, it had also been unable
to obtain samples of these drugs even from wholesalers.84 Mylan sought
samples of Thalomid and Revlimid to conduct the bioequivalence
studies required for an ANDA and stated that the FDA had found
Mylan’s safety protocols for these studies acceptable.85
Among other relief, Mylan asked the court for a preliminary and
mandatory injunctive order compelling Celgene to sell Mylan a
sufficient number of Thalomid and Revlimid samples at market price.86
Additionally, Mylan sought compensatory damages for the loss of
generic drug sales due to the delay of Mylan’s ability to submit its
ANDA.87 Celgene argued in its motion to dismiss that it had no duty to
deal with a potential competitor,88 and that Mylan’s claims were barred
as a matter of law because, among other reasons, they failed to plead
necessary elements, were outside the applicable statute of limitations, or
were precluded by presumptively valid patents.89 Oral arguments on
Celgene’s motion to dismiss took place on December 9, 2014.90
4. Claims in the Private Antitrust Cases
The primary antitrust claim in these three cases was that REMSrestricted brand-name drug manufacturers violated the antitrust laws
80. FTC Mylan Brief, supra note 6.
81. No. 2:14-CV-2094 (D.N.J. Apr. 3, 2014).
82. Id. at 1.
83. Mylan Complaint, supra note 5, at 2, 4.
84. Id. at 4, 21–22.
85. Id. at 3, 4, 21.
86. Id. at 81.
87. Id.
88. Brief in Support of Defendant Celgene Corp.’s Motion to Dismiss at 14, Mylan Pharm.
Inc. v. Celgene Corp., No. 2:14-CV-2094 (D.N.J. May 25, 2014).
89. Id. at 25, 28–29, 36.
90. Oral Opinion at 2, Mylan Pharm. Inc. v. Celgene Corp., No. 2:14-CV-2094 (D.N.J.
Dec. 22, 2014).
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when they refused to provide samples to generic manufacturers who
sought to reverse engineer the bioequivalence of the patented brandname drug.91 The REMS-restricted brand-name drug manufacturers
claimed that they had a right to refuse to deal with their rivals and that
there was no antitrust or other legal duty to provide drug samples to a
rival.92 Although exceptions to the refusal-to-deal doctrine exist, the
brand manufacturers asserted that these cases were not applicable.93
The generic manufacturers responded that brand manufacturers have
used the REMS program as a pretext to restrict access to brand-name
drugs rather than as an actual effort to benefit consumers.94 As evidence,
they pointed to a letter from the FDA stating that the agency did not
intend “to permit the restrictions of the [REMS] program to prevent
manufacturers of generic drugs from obtaining [samples] for use in
bioequivalence testing necessary to obtain [ANDA] approval.”95
Generic manufacturers further argued that refusal to provide drug
samples is merely an effort by brand manufacturers to maintain
monopoly power and prevent otherwise lawful generic competition that
would inevitably bring down prices and benefit consumers.96 This
argument alleged predatory intent and exclusionary conduct while
denying any purported procompetitive justifications.97
Generic manufacturers have also framed brand-name drugs as
“essential facilities” necessary to enter into competitive antitrust
markets.98 Brand manufacturers responded that the essential-facilities
doctrine is a dead letter that would not apply in a heavily regulated
91. See Lannett Co. v. Celgene Corp., No. 08-3920, 2011 WL 1193912, at *1 (E.D. Pa.
Mar. 29, 2011); Actelion Complaint, supra note 5, at 2; Mylan Complaint, supra note 5, at 2–4.
92. See, e.g., Actelion Complaint, supra note 5, at 9–10; Mylan Complaint, supra note 5,
at 35.
93. See, e.g., Actelion Complaint, supra note 5, at 11–13.
94. See, e.g., Roxane Counterclaim, supra note 16, at 28; Mylan Complaint, supra note 5,
at 2–4, 21.
95. Roxane Counterclaim, supra note 16, at 29. This statement did little to settle the
ongoing litigation over the issue and fell substantially short of imposing a requirement on the
brand manufacturer to give samples to generic manufacturers. See Karst, Decision in Lannett,
supra note 12; Rodi & Hughes, supra note 3. The FDA has also given some assurances that
bioequivalence studies are conducted with safe procedures, which should fulfill any concerns
about the REMS requirements. See, e.g., DRAFT GUIDANCE ON THALIDOMIDE, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN. (Dec. 2012), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceCompliance
RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM320038.pdf; How to Obtain a Letter from FDA Stating
that Bioequivalence Study Protocols Contain Safety Protection Comparable to Applicable REMS
for RLD, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Dec. 2014), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/
GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM425662.pdf.
96. See, e.g., Roxane Counterclaim, supra note 16, at 20–21.
97. Id. at 30, 41–42.
98. Id. at 45–46.
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industry where the supposed monopolist is fully complying with its
regulatory requirements.99
5. The FTC’s Analysis of the REMS Cases
The FTC and Connecticut’s attorney general’s office have both
launched an investigation in the aftermath of Lannett.100 Markus Meier,
assistant director of the FTC’s Healthcare Division, stated that the FTC
“definitely see[s REMS abuse] as a significant threat to competition.”101
Then-FTC Chairman Jon Leibowitz echoed these sentiments at the 2012
ABA Spring Antitrust Meeting.102 Connecticut’s Attorney General,
George Jepsen, has expressed his concern that these refusals are part of
“a disturbing, broader trend by certain branded drug manufacturers” to
use the REMS program “as a weapon to blunt the development of generic
drugs.”103
The FTC has publicly contributed to the debate on REMS-restricted
drugs by filing amicus briefs in the Actelion and Mylan cases in support
of the generics’ viewpoint that restricting access to brand-name drugs
may restrict competition and raise a triable antitrust issue.104 In general,
the FTC stated that “[u]nder certain circumstances, . . . a monopolist’s
refusal to sell to its rivals may violate Section 2 of the Sherman Act, and
vertical agreements may violate Section 1.”105 The FTC, thus, believes
that the generic manufacturers pled a plausible case for exclusionary
conduct under section 2 by restricting access to a necessary product.106
The FTC expressed concerns that this strategy by brand
manufacturers could pose a serious impediment to competition in the
99. Actelion Complaint, supra note 5, at 13.
100. Dina ElBoghdady, Generic-Drug Makers’ Complaints over Brand-Name Access
Prompt Investigations, WASH. P OST (May 22, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
business/economy/generic-drug-makers-complaints-over-distribution-law-provoke-investiga
tions/2012/0522/gIQAhExKiU_story.html.
101. Thomas, Drug Makers Use Safety, supra note 45.
102. Jonathan M. Ritch, R. Brendan Fee & Sarah Sandok Rabinovici, Healthcare Tops the
(Apr.
4,
2012),
Agenda
of
U.S. Antitrust Enforcers,
MORGAN LEWIS
www.morganlewis.com/index.cfm/fuseaction/publication.detail/publicationID/decf0a6b-c2064055-a3e0-d57f2976654d.
103. ElBoghdady, supra note 100 (internal quotation marks omitted).
104. Note that the FTC’s filings do not go so far as to say that it believes there is a violation
but merely state that it thinks there are cognizable antitrust claims. See, e.g., Press Release, FTC
Amicus Brief: Improper Use of Restricted Drug Distribution Programs May Impede Generic
Competition, FED. TRADE COMM’N (June 19, 2014), http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2014/06/ftc-amicus-brief-improper-use-restricted-drug-distribution; FTC Amicus Brief:
Improper Use of Restricted Drug Distribution Programs May Impede Generic Competition, FED.
TRADE COMM’N (Mar. 12, 2013), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2013/03/actelion.shtm.
105. FTC Mylan Brief, supra note 6, at 8.
106. Id. at 8–9.
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pharmaceutical industry,107 and might “prove costly for consumers of
prescription drugs [because competition] from lower priced generic
drugs saves American consumers billions of dollars a year.”108 The
FTC’s filings emphasized that the accelerated approval of generic drugs
under the Hatch–Waxman Act was very important in facilitating
competition and bringing down the cost of drugs for consumers.109
The FTC claimed that refusing to provide drug samples subverted the
goals of the Hatch–Waxman Act and possibly constituted violations of
sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.110 The agency noted that
bioequivalence testing requires a limited amount of the brand-name drug
in order for testing to proceed, and that allowing brand manufacturers to
restrict access throws a wrench into the entire generic drug development
process.111 The FDA has clarified, and also noted in its briefs, that a
brand manufacturer “may” sell samples of REMS-restricted drugs to a
generic manufacturer for bioequivalence testing without violating the
REMS.112 The FTC believes that neither the REMS restrictions nor the
drug’s patent protection is sufficient to justify restrictions on distribution
to generic manufacturers.113 The FTC focuses on the need for generic
substitution laws and the development of these generics under the
Hatch–Waxman Act as essential elements of reducing healthcare costs
by encouraging rapid development of lower priced drug options.114
II. REMS-RESTRICTED DRUGS AND THE BRAND MANUFACTURER’S
RIGHT TO REFUSE TO DEAL WITH GENERIC COMPETITORS
The FTC, without expressing an opinion on the ultimate merits of the
antitrust claims, provided an analysis of the Supreme Court’s section 2
jurisprudence in both of its amicus briefs and concluded in its Actelion
brief that “[t]he allegations in this case therefore fall within the
established contours of the Supreme Court’s refusal to deal
precedent.”115 Although notably quiet as to the ultimate conclusions of
107. Id. at 7.
108. Id. at 1.
109. Id. at 3–4; FTC Actelion Brief, supra note 6, at 4. The FTC voted 4–0 to file an amicus
brief in the Actelion case and voted 4–1 to file an amicus brief in the Mylan case, with only
Commissioner Joshua Wright voting against the filing. See Press Release, supra note 104.
110. FTC Mylan Brief, supra note 6, at 7–8, 15–17.
111. FTC Actelion Brief, supra note 6, at 4.
112. See FTC Mylan Brief, supra note 6, at 19; FTC Actelion Brief, supra note 6, at 7.
113. See David Leichtman, Inside the FTC’s Take on Generic Access to Branded Drugs,
LAW 360 (Apr. 5, 2013, 11:39 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/429209/inside-the-ftc-stake-on-generic-access-to-branded-drugs.
114. See, e.g., FTC Actelion Brief, supra note 6, at 17.
115. Id. at 15. One practitioner has argued that the FTC’s distinction on section 2 cases in
this area ignores “the public nature of the infrastructure” as the cause of monopoly power in the
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these cases, the FTC has stated that “the evidence may not ultimately
support any of the Sherman Act claims in this case, [but] the FTC
respectfully submits that they are not barred as a matter of law.”116
This Part summarizes the antitrust refusal-to-deal doctrine under
section 2 of the Sherman Act by analyzing prior Supreme Court
precedent cited in the FTC’s amicus briefs. It then discusses the various
tests in refusal-to-deal cases, such as the “no economic sense” or profitsacrifice test, and determines how prior course of dealings factor into the
tests. This Part then argues that refusal-to-deal claims in the REMS
context should be evaluated under the profit-sacrifice test.
A. Leading Refusal-to-Deal Cases
In its amicus briefs, the FTC offered a tortured analysis of section 2
jurisprudence in an ill-fated attempt to ramrod the facts of Actelion into
decades-old exceptions to the well-settled refusal-to-deal doctrine.
Looking to Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States,117 Aspen Skiing Co. v.
Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.,118 and Verizon Communications Inc. v.
Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP,119 the FTC sought to distinguish
these cases from the general rule that companies do not have a duty to
assist their rivals.120 Any comprehensive discussion of section 2 liability
requires an examination of these cases to sufficiently consider the
existing Supreme Court precedent. This Section analyzes the cases that
the FTC relied on to support its refusal-to-deal antitrust claims as well
as additional cases. This Section also distinguishes the present dispute
from the leading refusal-to-deal cases.
1. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States
In Otter Tail, the defendant, Otter Tail Power Co., was a power
company that used its monopoly in the retail distribution of electric
power to inhibit local towns from shifting their services to municipal
power providers.121 Otter Tail used franchise agreements with local
towns, but after the agreements expired, a number of the localities voted
case. See Leichtman, supra note 113. Thereby, the FTC’s argument—Actelion’s actions might
foreclose competition—does not sufficiently consider that in Otter Tail Power Co. v. United
States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973) and Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S.
585 (1985), the essential facilities were naturally limited resources or public goods, a limitation
not present in the current controversy. Id.
116. FTC Mylan Brief, supra note 6, at 8; FTC Actelion Brief, supra note 6, at 8–9.
117. 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
118. 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
119. 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
120. FTC Actelion Brief, supra note 6, at 9.
121. 410 U.S. at 368.
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to establish their own municipal electric systems.122 The new systems
required Otter Tail’s cooperation and transmission infrastructure to
operate.123 Otter Tail refused to cooperate and prevented development of
the new systems, thereby maintaining Otter Tail’s monopoly in retail
distribution of electric power.124 The Supreme Court affirmed a district
court opinion finding that Otter Tail had “used its monopoly power in
the towns in its service area to foreclose competition or gain a
competitive advantage, or to destroy a competitor, all in violation of the
antitrust laws.”125
Otter Tail is a case where the Court found section 2 antitrust liability
despite a lack of a prior course of dealings between the parties and where
the actions of a monopolist foreclosed competition with a mere
“potential entrant[].”126 This characterization of the case is correct, and
other commentators have reached the same conclusion.127 Nevertheless,
Otter Tail stands for a very limited proposition and rule. Rather than
representing a strong duty to deal, the Otter Tail decision is restricted to
its fairly limited facts. Otter Tail represented a natural monopoly where
the high start-up costs and the low marginal costs of doing business only
allowed a single operator in any one limited area.128 The power industry
is heavily regulated and controlled by outside regulatory agencies,
making the Court’s antitrust decision easier to implement because there
was little need for the Court to oversee the resulting duty to deal.129
Moreover, Otter Tail had already incurred the cost of the required
infrastructure and, other than the ability to limit the development of
future rivals, would have nothing to lose from complying with its
regulatory obligation to “wheel” the power of municipal power
providers.130 Accordingly, Otter Tail’s refusal made no economic sense
122. Id. at 371.
123. Id. at 370.
124. Id. at 371–73.
125. Id. at 377.
126. FTC Actelion Brief, supra note 6, at 9–10 (quoting Otter Tail, 410 U.S. at 377) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
127. See, e.g., Susan A. Creighton & Jonathan M. Jacobson, Twenty-Five Years of Access
Denials, 27 ANTITRUST 50, 53 (2012) (“Fairly read, then, neither Aspen [Skiing] nor Kodak
compels a prior course of dealing screen. And, importantly, Otter Tail—a decision that the
Supreme Court has never questioned and often cites—is inconsistent with any such rule.”).
128. See Otter Tail, 410 U.S. at 369.
129. See Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 58
ANTITRUST L.J. 841, 848 (1990) (“[T]here was already in place a regulatory agency that
supervised prices and terms of dealings with local distributors. Thus, the Court could airily
require Otter Tail to deal but never burden itself with the administrative details, because the
Federal Power Commission had the statutory authority and presumed expertness to regulate the
prices and terms of dealing. Otter Tail is thus quite narrow.”).
130. See id. at 847–48.
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other than as an anticompetitive scheme.131
Refusing to provide brand-name drug samples is distinguishable from
Otter Tail because the brand manufacturers are not under a clear
regulatory obligation to provide samples and, as discussed below, these
actions were taken with legitimate business justifications.132 The
regulatory goals of Congress and federal agencies need to be held
distinct from the broader and more generalized goals of antitrust, a
position the Supreme Court eventually took in Trinko.133
2. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.
In Aspen Skiing, the plaintiff (Aspen) owned three of four major ski
resorts in Aspen, Colorado, while Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.
(Highlands) owned the fourth resort.134 Aspen and Highlands provided a
single pass that allowed entry into all four resorts.135 But then Aspen
terminated the pass, which severely limited Highlands’ patronage.136
Aspen refused to offer the four-resort pass despite Highlands’ offer to
accept a fairly low fixed percentage of the joint revenues.137 Aspen also
refused to sell tickets to Highlands’ resort and refused to honor vouchers
that Highlands issued as part of its competing pass.138 Highlands sued,
alleging that Aspen’s refusal to deal constituted a violation of section 2
of the Sherman Act because Aspen had used its monopoly power to
foreclose competition and act predatorily.139 The Supreme Court
affirmed the finding of the district court that Aspen did have a duty to
deal because its conduct was not supported by any valid business or
efficiency justifications.140 The Court declared that a firm’s refusal to
deal is not unqualified and that the prior course of dealings between the
two companies and Highlands’ offer to essentially insure Aspen at full
retail price amounted to a duty to offer the four-mountain pass.141
Moreover, the Court found that Aspen’s behavior was exclusionary and
was tantamount to predatory action that justified liability under section
2.142
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

See Creighton & Jacobson, supra note 127, at 54.
See infra Section II.C.
See infra text accompanying note 157.
472 U.S. 585, 587–88 & nn. 2–5 (1985).
Id. at 591.
Id. at 594.
Id. at 591–93.
Id. at 593–94.
Id. at 595.
Id. at 608–09, 611.
Id. at 601, 603.
Id. at 610.
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In its Actelion brief, the FTC turned to Aspen Skiing for the
proposition that exclusionary conduct is more suspect when it is
undertaken for reasons other than efficiency.143 The FTC noted that the
Supreme Court in Aspen Skiing characterized the conduct as being taken
for predatory reasons when it “does not further competition on the
merits” and “impair[s] the opportunities of rivals.”144 Nevertheless, the
FTC provided no analogy or factual discussion that compared Actelion
to the Aspen Skiing exception, and it merely presumed predatory
intent.145 As explained below, the rule from Aspen Skiing is notably
limited by the Court’s subsequent decision in Trinko, which makes clear
that Aspen Skiing is a rare exception that “is at or near the outer boundary
of § 2 liability.”146
The Actelion, Lannett, and Mylan cases are more distinguishable
from Aspen Skiing than they are similar. First, as noted by the FTC, there
is no prior course of dealing from which to infer that the refusal to deal
would be profitable.147 Second, as is true of all generic market entry,
there are obvious reasons to believe that such generic entry would harm
a brand manufacturer’s profits and reduce its incentive to invest in new
drugs in the future.148 Third, as discussed below, there are valid business
reasons that justify the brand manufacturers’ refusals to deal.149 Taken
together, the FTC draws a shallow comparison to the exception in Aspen
Skiing and assumes away all evidence to the contrary without a
substantive discussion of the competitive merits of the alleged business
conduct.
3. Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of
Curtis V. Trinko, LLP
In Trinko, the Court found that Verizon, the incumbent local
exchange carrier, “enjoyed an exclusive franchise within its local service
area.”150 Verizon competed with local exchange carriers but had a
regulatory obligation to complete “orders for service through an
143. FTC Actelion Brief, supra note 6, at 10.
144. Id. (quoting Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 605, n.32 (internal quotation marks omitted)).
145. See id.
146. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 409
(2004); see also United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919) (holding that the
antitrust laws do “not restrict the long recognized right of [a] trader or manufacturer engaged in
an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with
whom he will deal”).
147. FTC Actelion Brief, supra note 6, at 12.
148. See infra Section III.A.
149. See infra Section II.C.
150. 540 U.S. at 402.
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electronic interface with Verizon’s ordering system.”151 Complaints
emerged that Verizon was discriminatorily fulfilling these orders and
creating a substantial barrier to entry for potential rivals.152 Verizon was
concurrently under investigation by the FCC and ultimately entered into
a consent decree to ensure compliance with its regulatory obligations.153
The Court concluded that Verizon did not have a duty to deal with its
rivals and rejected the notion that separate congressional or regulatory
obligations altered Verizon’s antitrust obligations.154 The Court
reasoned that monopolists might legally charge monopoly prices and do
not have expanded obligations to deal with rivals.155 The Court also
warned about error costs in complicated and heavily regulated
industries.156 It indicated that the general competition goals of the
antitrust laws are often inconsistent with the more specific goals of
congressional regulation: “Mistaken inferences and the resulting false
condemnations ‘are especially costly, because they chill the very conduct
the antitrust laws are designed to protect.’”157
In its Actelion brief, the FTC looked to Trinko for three exceptions to
the general principle that there is no obligation to aid your rivals. First,
the FTC did not believe that a prior course of dealing was a prerequisite
to finding antitrust liability.158 Instead, the FTC argued that the Court
should look to the effects on competition and a company’s decision to
sacrifice short-term profits absent a procompetitive business
justification.159 This approach is correct and, regardless of the existence
of a valid business reason, indicates that refusals to provide drug samples
for generic development may warrant a searching inquiry into the details
of the relevant market. As discussed above, the FTC does not delve into
efficiency justifications and does not provide a closer comparison of the
cases.160
Second, the FTC looked to language in Trinko stating that the
company was refusing to sell something it “was already in the business
of providing.”161 In other words, by the FTC’s logic, providing these
samples to generic manufacturers would not impose any increased
151. Id. at 403.
152. Id. at 404.
153. Id. at 403–04.
154. Id. at 409–11.
155. Id. at 407–08.
156. Id. at 414–15.
157. Id. at 414 (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
594 (1986)).
158. FTC Actelion Brief, supra note 6, at 11–12.
159. Id. at 12–13.
160. See supra text accompanying notes 143–49.
161. FTC Actelion Brief, supra note 6, at 14 (quoting Trinko, 540 U.S. at 410).
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burden or harm on brand manufacturers because the companies were
already supplying the drugs to someone other than the generic.162 This
argument ignores the basic presumption that these companies have a
right to choose with whom they do business. Brand manufacturers sell
drugs to consumers, hospitals, and wholesalers, but none of these sales
create a duty to sell to a competing generic manufacturer.163 Again, it is
true that the sales would have no immediate adverse effect,164 but that
fact is generally irrelevant to the overarching antitrust obligations. The
FTC seemingly argued that brand manufacturers have an obligation to
deal with their rivals merely because it is possible.165 That argument is
insufficient to clear the high hurdle imposed in Trinko and provides no
illumination as to why such an obligation should exist.
Third, the FTC stated that many of the anticompetitive concerns
expressed in Trinko, including (1) “undermin[ing] the incentive to
invest” in the joint product, (2) “setting the terms and conditions on
which the monopolist must deal,” and (3) “encouraging collusion
between the monopolist and its would-be rivals,” are not present in these
pharmaceutical cases.166
Although the second and third points are likely true, the first is much
less clear.167 A substantial amount of research suggests that earlier
generic entry and the uncertainty of patent terms created by the Hatch–
Waxman Act may have significant effects on the incentive to invest in
new drugs.168 Patent length is less certain, and the return on investment
is lower when there is the uncertainty of infringement lawsuits and

162. Id. at 15.
163. See Actelion Complaint, supra note 5, at 10.
164. FTC Actelion Brief, supra note 6, at 15.
165. See id. at 14–15.
166. Id. at 14–15 (citing Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407–08).
167. It is possible that the second point might also be a concern in the REMS context. It is
unlikely that the FTC or federal courts will be effective central planners for terms and conditions
or supply contracts between brand and generic firms for REMS-restricted drugs. It is equally
unlikely that the FTC or courts will be the best day-to-day enforcer of any established supply
contract provisions. See Jan M. Rybnicek, When Does Sharing Make Sense?: Antitrust & Risk
Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., Apr. 2014, at 7, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2429330 (proposing that the FDA, not the
FTC, should use its “existing tools” to regulate REMs-restricted drugs).
168. See Panattoni, supra note 8, at 144 (“Paragraph IV decisions, largely starting in the
late 1990s, may have strong implications for R&D incentives and . . . brand firms may have a
considerable incentive to avoid the uncertainty and large potential profitability [losses]
associated with these decisions. . . . [A] practical reality for the pharmaceutical industry was that
patent length was more certain before 1998 than it was in the period afterward. An uncertain
patent length has the benefits of possible early generic entry but brand and generic reactions raise
the potential for negative welfare consequences.”).
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earlier generic entry.169 Accordingly, a longer guaranteed period of
brand exclusivity ensures a strong incentive for manufacturing
companies to invest in new and innovative drugs.
Also, as one response has noted, Trinko departed from previous
refusal-to-deal cases specifically because it emphasized that monopoly
power is lawful, and often desirable, in markets, and that a strong right
to refuse to deal has many economic justifications, such as increasing the
“incentive to invest in markets characterized by scale economies” and
avoiding the necessity for “courts to act as central planners.”170 Both
benefits would be realized in the REMS-restriction cases and weigh
against antitrust intervention.
4. The Profit-Sacrifice Test, No-Economic-Sense Test, and
Prior Course of Dealing
The starting point for any refusal-to-deal analysis is that there is no
duty to deal and that only exceptional and exceedingly rare
circumstances allow for such a finding under the antitrust laws. The
Court has previously found antitrust liability for refusal to deal in cases
where a firm refused to sell a product or service to some competitors but
not others, or where a firm was engaged in a prior course of dealing with
a competitor and then changed course by refusing to continue to deal.171
Literature identifies two main tests for a refusal-to-deal analysis: the
profit-sacrifice test and the no-economic-sense test.172
A prior course of dealing can serve as a proxy for evaluating the
potential economic harms or benefits resulting from the conduct.173 For
example, a prior course of dealing suggests that the refusal results in the
sacrifice of profits and likely indicates that there is no valid business
justification for the change in course.174 One commentator has explained
the profit-sacrifice test as follows: “[T]he decision maker weighs the
costs and benefits of the conduct to the defendant. In particular, under
169. See id.
170. Creighton & Jacobson, supra note 127, at 50–51.
171. Guide to Antitrust Laws: Refusal to Deal, FED. TRADE COMM’N,
http://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/single-firm-conduct/
refusal-deal (last visited May 1, 2015); see also, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands
Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605, 608–11 (1985); Areeda, supra note 129, at 852.
172. See A. Douglas Melamed, Exclusive Dealing Agreements and Other Exclusionary
Conduct—Are There Unifying Principles?, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 375, 389 (2006) (describing the
profit-sacrifice test); Gregory J. Werden, Identifying Exclusionary Conduct Under Section 2: The
“No Economic Sense” Test, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 413, 422 (2006) (describing the no-economicsense test).
173. See Creighton & Jacobson, supra note 127, at 52.
174. See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
409 (2004).
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this test, conduct is anticompetitive if, but only if, it makes no business
sense or is unprofitable for the defendant but for the exclusion of rivals
and resulting supra-competitive recoupment.”175 Note that the test sets a
fairly high bar for finding antitrust liability.176
This test is conceptually identical to the no-economic-sense test,
which is named merely to avoid confusion with obviously
procompetitive conduct that sacrifices short-run profits, such as research
and development or the costs of training employees.177 One reading of
the relationship between the tests, rooted in Aspen Skiing and Otter Tail,
is that a prior course of dealing can be evidence that the no economic
sense test is satisfied.178 To determine the justifiability of a firm’s
behavior, Professor Douglas Melamed believes that “[f]irms will have to
ask only whether their conduct makes good business sense regardless of
increases in their market power.”179 This is because a legitimate business
purpose will generally succeed in defending even a suspicious refusal to
deal against an alleged antitrust violation.180
B. Regulation and Antitrust in Credit Suisse
There is ample literature on the relationship between regulation and
antitrust, establishing that at times antitrust liability is not the most
appropriate remedy, especially when other regulatory frameworks are
already in place.181 If Trinko makes clear that refusal-to-deal cases are

175. Melamed, supra note 172, at 389. Professor Douglas Melamed argues that the two
relevant inquiries for this test are whether the defendant has given up profitable sales in a costbenefit analysis and whether the conduct allowed the defendant to increase or maintain its market
power by forgoing otherwise unprofitable sales. Id. at 389–90; see also Werden, supra note 172,
at 414 (“[T]hat test asks whether challenged conduct would have been expected to be profitable
apart from any gains that conduct may produce through eliminating competition.”).
176. See Melamed, supra note 172, at 390 & n.42.
177. For an explanation of the no-economic-sense test, see Werden, supra note 172, at 422–
25. For a discussion of the no-economic-sense test in the REMS context, see Rybnicek, supra
note 167, at 6–7.
178. See generally Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); Aspen
Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 597 (1985).
179. Melamed, supra note 172, at 393.
180. Areeda, supra note 129, at 852.
181. See, e.g., Bruce H. Kobayashi & Joshua D. Wright, Federalism, Substantive
Preemption, and Limits on Antitrust: An Application to Patent Holdup, 5 J. COMPETITION L. &
ECON. 469, 475 (2009) (“[T]he Supreme Court’s antitrust jurisprudence is consistent with the
proposition that the extension of antitrust liability to conduct that is adequately regulated by
alternative legal rules and institutions is appropriately limited when the marginal benefit of
antitrust enforcement is low or negative.”); Howard A. Shelanski, The Case for Rebalancing
Antitrust and Regulation, 109 MICH. L. REV. 683, 684–85 (2011) (discussing the changing role
of and limitations on antitrust in regulated markets).
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on the outer boundary of section 2 antitrust liability,182 Credit Suisse
Securities (USA) LLC v. Billing 183 may put similar cases completely out
of reach.184 In Credit Suisse, a class of buyers of securities alleged that
underwriting firms engaged in behavior that violated antitrust laws.185
The buyers alleged that in order to purchase a popular new security, the
underwriters set up an agreement that forced buyers to purchase
additional shares of that security at increasingly higher prices (called
“laddering”), pay the underwriters unusually high commissions on future
purchases, or purchase less desirable securities (called “tying”).186 The
Court agreed with the underwriters that federal securities law and the
active supervision of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
impliedly exempted this behavior from antitrust scrutiny.187
The Court believed that this case fell within their existing preemption
test from Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc.,188 where the Court
would not apply antitrust law when: (1) the conduct fell “squarely within
the heartland of securities regulations;” (2) the SEC had “clear and
adequate” authority to regulate; (3) there was “active and ongoing
agency regulation;” and (4) there was “a serious conflict between the
antitrust and regulatory regimes.”189 The fourth consideration was the
most hotly contested, but the Court found that the complexities of
securities law were best left to the SEC to regulate, and that a conflicting
antitrust regime would “threaten[] serious securities-related harm.”190
Moreover, the SEC already takes competition concerns into account in
applying securities law, thereby making a separate cause of action in
federal court unnecessary.191
Some commentators suggest that Credit Suisse takes a step beyond
Trinko by disapproving antitrust scrutiny of behavior governed by
regulatory bodies with active and ongoing supervision.192 The FTC’s
182. See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
408–09 (2004).
183. 551 U.S. 264 (2007).
184. See Kobayashi & Wright, supra note 181, at 474 (“Specifically, Credit Suisse
recognizes the value of limiting antitrust enforcement under circumstances where an alternative
and competent regulatory apparatus is available and antitrust enforcement is likely to result in
little additional social value because of the potential for welfare-reducing errors.”).
185. 551 U.S. at 267.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 267–68.
188. 422 U.S. 659 (1975).
189. Credit Suisse, 551 U.S. at 285.
190. Id. at 279.
191. See, e.g., id. at 283.
192. See Kobayashi & Wright, supra note 181, at 477 (“The message from the Court in
Credit Suisse is that caution and modesty are warranted in considering an expansion of antitrust
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briefs in Actelion and Mylan notably omit Credit Suisse,193 even though
a colorable argument can be made that Actelion’s or Celgene’s actions
should qualify for implied immunity from antitrust law under the Credit
Suisse standard. Applying the Gordon test to these refusal-to-deal cases
shows the first two prongs easily satisfied. That is, the FDA’s authority
in this case (1) likely fits squarely within the heartland of pharmaceutical
regulation because (2) the FDA has authority to enforce its own rules.194
Generic manufacturers will certainly argue that the FDA’s failure to
clarify the regulatory obligation in these cases means they have not met
the third prong of the test involving active and ongoing regulation,195 but
a court would likely disagree with this characterization. The FDA is
aware of and actively involved in these cases. The agency has responded
to some of the citizen petitions and, as recently as July 2013, held a
public meeting to receive outside comment for reform.196 The generic
manufacturers’ dissatisfaction with the pace and level of FDA action is
not an argument that the agency is failing to actively regulate. It should
be noted, however, that the FDA has acknowledged that it is not best
positioned to address the competition-related issues raised by REMSs.197
In fact, the FDA stated in a recent citizen petition response that “issues
related to ensuring that marketplace actions are fair and do not block
competition would be best addressed by the FTC, which is the Federal
entity most expert in investigating and addressing anticompetitive
business practices.”198 Of course, the agencies do not decide their
jurisdiction over REMS-related competition concerns; rather, Congress
determines this issue.199 This is why we should be careful not to construe
the FDA’s request for help as grounds for FTC intervention in this area.
The applicability of the fourth prong of the Gordon test to REMS
restriction refusal-to-deal cases is unclear and likely a closer call than in
Credit Suisse.200 It is difficult to determine if there is a conflict between
liability when there is a competent alternative regulatory structure in place and the risks of false
positives is significant.”).
193. See generally FTC Mylan Brief, supra note 6; FTC Actelion Brief, supra note 6.
194. See Credit Suisse, 551 U.S. at 285.
195. Id. at 285.
196. See Public Meeting: Standardizing and Evaluating Risk Evaluation and Mitigation
FOOD
&
DRUG
ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/forindustry/userfees/
Strategies,
prescriptiondruguserfee/ucm351029.htm (last updated Sept. 17, 2013).
197. Letter from Janet Woodcock, supra note 40, at 7.
198. Id.
199. See id. at 7–8 (recognizing the limits of the FDA’s existing authority to collaborate
with the FTC over REMS-related issues); Independent Agencies and Government Corporations,
USA.GOV, http://www.usa.gov/Agencies/Federal/Independent.shtml (last updated Feb. 2, 2015)
(noting that Congress creates independent agencies and thus the extent of their jurisdictions).
200. See Credit Suisse, 551 U.S. at 285.
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the goals of pharmaceutical regulation and antitrust law because
resolution of this question requires the application of both claims prior
to deciding whether the antitrust claims are even relevant. The antitrust
laws focus on promoting competition, consumer welfare, and priceeffects, while relevant pharmaceutical regulations, including the
FDAAA, are more concerned with patient health and safety.201 There is
not an obvious conflict, but even critics of Credit Suisse have admitted
that the result is broad and creates a wide area of antitrust immunity in
regulated industries. Howard Shelanski, former-Deputy Director for
Antitrust in the Bureau of Economics at the FTC, submitted a written
statement to Congress that included the following:
Credit Suisse goes beyond prior implied immunity cases by
blocking some antitrust claims that are based on legitimate
antitrust principles, are consistent with securities laws, and
are not potentially repugnant to the regulatory scheme, but
where the underlying conduct is similar enough to regulated
conduct that a judge might confuse the two and create a
conflict with regulatory authority.202
The Court in Credit Suisse does not articulate a cogent statement of
what it means for the statutes to conflict. The Court does, however,
provide some factors to consider, including: (1) the regulatory agency’s
concern with antitrust policy; (2) the possibility of error costs in general
district courts and private suits; (3) the likelihood of conflicting guidance
or requirements; and (4) the likelihood that antitrust juries would make
serious mistakes.203
Applied to REMS restriction refusal-to-deal cases, the first factor
sways against the application of antitrust immunity because the FDA is
not concerned with competition policy.204 But the remaining factors are
certainly debatable. This Article argues that these REMS restriction201. Compare ANTITRUSTLAWS.ORG, http://www.antitrustlaws.org/ (last visited May 1,
2015) (noting the goals of antitrust laws), with Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act
(FDAAA) of 2007, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/regulatoryinformation/legislation/federalfooddrug
andcosmeticactfdcact/significantamendmentstothefdcact/foodanddrugadministrationamendmen
tsactof2007/default.htm (last updated Dec. 2, 2011) (explaining the benefits of the FDAAA).
202. Is There Life After Trinko and Credit Suisse? The Role of Antitrust in Regulated
Industries: Hearing Before the H.R. Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on Courts and
Competition Policy, 111th Cong. 6 (2010) (statement of the Federal Trade Commission),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2010/06/prepared-statement-federal-tradecommission-courts-and-competition-policy.
203. See Credit Suisse, 551 U.S. at 275–76, 281–82. It can be inferred from this guidance
that the analysis is more detailed than merely asking what the generalized goals of the two
statutes at issue seek to promote. Accordingly, courts may need to evaluate the specific claims
in a case—in a broader regulatory context—to reach a sensible conclusion.
204. See Letter from Janet Woodcock, supra note 40, at 7.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016

27

Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 3 [2016], Art. 1

1004

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

related cases raise a high likelihood of significant error costs205 and
promote harmful market uncertainty.206 This Article also argues that if
brand manufacturers are violating neither the FDAAA nor the antitrust
laws, then Credit Suisse is inapplicable, meaning that antitrust law
should be applied but it was not violated. Alternatively, if a brand
manufacturer has violated antitrust law, then Credit Suisse might still
provide a safe harbor from liability if a court determines that there is a
conflict after comparing the complex goals of the two regimes.207
Another possibility is that the conduct violates antitrust law that is
inconsistent with pharmaceutical regulations, meaning that there is a
conflict and thus rendering the action immune from antitrust law.
Most likely, Credit Suisse will not apply because there is not an
intuitive or obvious conflict between the relevant statutes, and there may
not be a conflict in the interpretation of the specific actions and claims
of the case; that is, a court may determine that the failure to give drug
samples to generic drug manufacturers is not an antitrust violation and is
not a regulatory violation. These two consistent findings mean that a
court will not apply antitrust immunity under Credit Suisse, but—having
already found no antitrust violation—a court would then dismiss the
case.
C. Legitimate Business Justifications for a Refusal to Provide
REMS-Restricted Samples to Generic Competitors
As stated in Aspen Skiing and reflected in all of the Supreme Court’s
refusal-to-deal cases, no refusal to deal by a monopolist is deemed
anticompetitive for purposes of antitrust liability if it is justified by
“valid business reasons . . . . In other words, if there were legitimate
business reasons for the refusal, then the defendant, even if he is found
to possess monopoly power in a relevant market, has not violated the

205. See infra Part III.
206. See infra Section III.B.
207. In one sense this is a chicken-and-the-egg argument because it is possible that a court
would need to evaluate the merits of the antitrust claim to determine if it should apply antitrust
law at all. It may be easiest to think about this prong as a matrix with four possibilities: (1) if
regulatory law is violated and antitrust law is not, then the court could apply antitrust law
although the outcome is moot; (2) if neither regulatory nor antitrust law were violated, then the
court will have to consider the goals of both regimes to determine if they are in conflict, but
again, the outcome is irrelevant; (3) if both regulatory and antitrust law were violated, then there
is seemingly consistency but a court would still need to determine that those violations did not
represent conflicting goals; or (4) if regulatory law was not violated but the antitrust laws were,
then there is a clear conflict and antitrust law should be precluded, likely immunizing the
behavior from scrutiny.
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law.”208 Even when the conditions of a refusal to deal are substantially
or obviously anticompetitive, a “legitimate business purpose always
saves the defendant.”209 And, in cases with claims more comparable to
the generic manufacturers than those by Highland in Aspen Skiing, many
courts have directly recognized, for example, that the desire to exclude
others from protected intellectual property is itself a presumptively
lawful valid business justification insulating a refusal to deal from
antitrust liability.210
It is notable that the FTC did not take a stance on the issue of valid
business justifications in the Actelion case. Instead, the FTC stated that
“Actelion may ultimately demonstrate that its refusal to sell to the
generic firms is supported by a legitimate business justification. For
purposes of this motion, however, the generic firms[’] contrary
allegations are accepted as true.”211 At least three valid business
justifications, which are addressed in more detail below, support the
decision to refuse to provide drug samples of REMS- and ETASUrestricted drugs.
1. Regulatory Compliance: Distribution of Drugs Outside of
the Explicit ETASU Restrictions Could Result in Substantial
Fines or Penalties
One example of a REMS-restricted drug that demonstrates some of
the dangers posed by drugs subject to these restrictions is Thalidomide,
also marketed under the name Thalomid.212 The drug has a horrific
history. Prescribed in the 1960s to pregnant women for morning
sickness, even a single dose of thalidomide could cause severe birth
defects, or even death, in unborn babies.213 Before the drug was banned
from pharmacies in 1962, there were an estimated 12,000 “thalidomide
babies” born with phocomelia—severely deformed arms and legs also
208. 472 U.S. 585, 597 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing the case’s jury
instructions).
209. Areeda, supra note 129, at 852.
210. See, e.g., Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1218
(9th Cir. 1997) (“Under the fact-based approaches of Aspen Skiing . . . . a monopolist’s ‘desire
to exclude others from its [protected] work is a presumptively valid business justification for any
immediate harm to consumers.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting Data Gen. Corp. v.
Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1187 (1st Cir. 1994))).
211. FTC Actelion Brief, supra note 6, at 11 n.32.
212. Thalidomide, U.S. NAT’L LIBRARY OF MED., NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH,
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/druginfo/meds/a699032.html (last updated May 19, 2015).
213. Id.; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Thalidomide Approved to Treat Leprosy, with Other Uses
Seen, N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/07/17/us/thalidomideapproved-to-treat-leprosy-with-other-uses-seen.html (reporting on the side effects of
thalidomide).
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called “seal-flipper limbs.”214 Only about 5000 “thalidomide babies”
were still alive in 1998, when the FDA approved the use of thalidomide
in the United States for the first time after it proved effective at treating
complications from leprosy.215
Today, people use the drug to treat not only leprosy but also cancer
and HIV-related symptoms.216 The side effects, which can occur during
and after treatment, are severe; aside from causing severe birth defects,
thalidomide can seriously affect the human nervous system.217 As a
result, the drug is subject to a REMS program that one observer in 1998
described as “the most strictly regulated . . . in the nation’s history.”218
The system includes guidelines that women must at all times use two
methods of birth control, and must undergo regular pregnancy tests while
using thalidomide.219 Further, “[a]ll people who are prescribed
thalidomide . . . must be registered with Thalidomide REMS®, have a
thalidomide prescription from a doctor who is registered . . . , and have
the prescription filled at a [registered] pharmacy . . . to receive this
medication.”220 Additionally, thalidomide patients cannot donate blood
during and for four weeks after treatment, and doctors may only write “a
prescription for up to a 28-day supply . . . with no refills,” which the
patient must fill “within 7 days.”221
REMS-restricted drugs have greater safety and health risks. The
thalidomide example illustrates that REMS programs ensure that misuse
or adverse effects of these drugs can result in the FDA or courts imposing
substantial fines or regulatory penalties pursuant to federal law. In
extreme cases, a single REMS violation, when recurring, can warrant up
to a $10 million fine.222 Due to the significant confusion over the
214. Stolberg, supra note 213.
215. Id.
216. Thalidomide, supra note 212.
217. Id.
218. Stolberg, supra note 213.
219. Id.
220. Thalidomide, supra note 212.
221. Id.
222. The FDA has issued a draft guidance detailing potential fines for violations of the
requirements. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY:
FORMAT AND CONTENT OF PROPOSED RISK EVALUATION AND MITIGATION STRATEGIES (REMS),
REMS ASSESSMENTS, AND PROPOSED REMS MODIFICATIONS (Sept. 2009), available at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/Guidances/UCM184128.pdf. One section states that
a responsible person who violates a REMS requirement is subject to civil
monetary penalties of up to $250,000 per violation . . . . These penalties increase
if the violation continues more than 30 days after FDA notifies the responsible
person of the violation. The penalties double for the second 30-day period, and
continue to double for subsequent 30-day periods, up to $1 million per period
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requirements for compliance with REMS, brand manufacturers are
understandably concerned about their potential exposure.
One commentator has raised concerns that brand manufacturers are
selling drugs “to third parties who will conduct human trials over which
the branded companies have no control. Third parties’ failure to follow
the meticulous use provisions could result in liability litigation against
the branded manufacturer.”223 Even limited studies need to ensure that
the use of the drugs complies with REMS requirements and, absent a
clear showing that they will be conducted safely and according to FDA
standards, brand manufacturers raise valid questions regarding potential
penalties.
Absent a more persuasive plan for use of the drugs and general
clarification from the FDA over compliance with REMS requirements,
brand manufacturers have little proof that providing drug samples would
not carry a risk of substantial sanctions; and they have little recourse to
protect themselves against third-party actions. This explains why
Actelion demanded reasonable assurances from the counterclaimants
and the FDA that its REMS-restricted drugs would be administered in
compliance with ETASU requirements.224
2. Products Liability: Recent Changes to Pharmaceutical Products
Liability Law Imposed a Heightened Duty on Brand Manufacturers to
Control and Safeguard Dangerous Drugs
The state of brand-name and generic drug competition has recently
taken a number of peculiar turns that appear perverse and shift heavy
liabilities onto the brand manufacturer while at the same time insulating
generic manufacturers from similar liability.225 The Supreme Court came
to seemingly contradictory conclusions when it determined that people
could sue brand manufacturers for failing to warn of potential risks on
pharmaceutical labels in Wyeth v. Levine,226 but then found that victims
and $10 million per proceeding.
Id. at 7.
223. Glenn G. Lammi, Is FTC Becoming an All-Purpose Health Care Cost Regulator?,
FORBES (May 31, 2012, 1:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/wlf/2012/05/31/is-ftcbecoming-an-all-purpose-health-care-cost-regulator.
224. See supra Subsection I.C.2.
225. See, e.g., Lawrence O. Gostin, The FDA, Preemption, and Public Safety:
Antiregulatory Effects and Maddening Inconsistency (Georgetown Public Law and Legal Theory
Research, Paper No. 11-129, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1945985 (“Thus, in
less than four years, the Court barred state health and safety litigation for FDA-approved medical
devices, allowed failure-to-warn claims for branded pharmaceuticals, and then barred those same
claims for generic pharmaceuticals.”).
226. 555 U.S. 555, 581 (2009).
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of generic drugs could not sue the generic manufacturer because federal
law preempted their tort claims in PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing.227 The
Court’s justification in Mensing was that although there should be a
remedy against the generic manufacturer under state labeling laws,
federal law required that generic labels be identical to the brand-name
drug label and thus precluded a separate cause of action.228 The result is
that brand manufacturers face substantially more tort liability for the
manufacture and production of their products than generic manufacturers
selling, by legal mandate, an identical product.229
In some areas of the United States, legal liability has become even
more confusing. In Conte v. Wyeth, Inc.,230 the California Court of
Appeals held that a brand manufacturer has a duty of care that can lead
to liability even when the patient has only taken the generic version of
the drug.231 This is because the patient and doctor foreseeably rely on the
product warnings of brand-name drugs regardless of which product is
ultimately used to fill a prescription.232 In other words, the brand
manufacturer can have substantial tort liability arising from errors,
mistakes, or inconsistencies caused by its generic rivals.
Some state courts have followed suit. The Supreme Court of Alabama
held that brand manufacturers could be liable for fraudulent or
misrepresentative statements made “in connection with the manufacture
of a brand-name prescription drug” to a plaintiff only harmed by a
generic version.233 This cause of action has become known as innovator
227. 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2580–81 (2011), reh’g denied, 132 S. Ct. 55 (2011); see also Mut.
Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2470 (2013) (extending Mensing and holding that “statelaw design-defect claims that turn on the adequacy of a drug’s warnings are pre-empted by
federal law”).
228. See Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2572–74, 2581.
229. See, e.g., Gostin, supra note 225.
230. 168 Cal. App. 4th 89 (2008).
231. Id. at 114 (holding that “Wyeth’s common-law duty to use due care in formulating its
product warnings extends to patients whose doctors foreseeably rely on its product information
when prescribing [its brand-name drug] . . . whether the prescription is written for and/or filled
with [the brand-name drug] or its generic equivalent”). For a more extensive discussion of the
consequences of this decision, see Bridget M. Ahmann & Erin M. Verneris, Name Brand
Exposure for Generic Drug Use: Prescription for Liability, 32 HAMLINE L. REV. 767, 769 (2009).
A similar unpublished decision issued from the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas. Id.; see
Clark v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 1819, 2008 Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. LEXIS 74 (Mar. 14, 2008). Nevertheless,
most states continue to follow the more sensible rule from Foster v. American Home Products
Corp. that liability only arises when the injured plaintiff can show that she took the defendant’s
manufactured drug. See 29 F.3d 165, 170 (4th Cir. 1994); see also Brian Wolfman & Anne King,
Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett and Its Implications, BLOOMBERG LAW (Oct. 21, 2013),
http://www.bna.com/mutual-pharmaceutical-co-v-bartlett-and-its-implications/ (stating that
most courts do not follow Conte and that “[t]he lead case is . . . Foster”).
232. Conte, 168 Cal. App. 4th at 94–95.
233. Wyeth, Inc. v. Weeks, No. 1101397, 2014 WL 4055813, at *22 (Ala. Aug. 15, 2014).
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liability.234 A court in Vermont issued a similar ruling, holding that brand
manufacturers have a duty to warn users of the generic versions of their
drugs about potential side effects and risks.235
Innovator liability does not only affect manufacturers of brand-name
drugs while their patented products are in the market. Often, brand
manufacturers abandon the production of certain pharmaceuticals after
generic entry, because the drug’s resulting lower cost no longer justifies
the manufacturer’s costs of production, distribution, and potential
liability.236 Nevertheless, the brand manufacturer still may face liability
for adverse events occurring from a generic drug that the brand
manufacturer no longer produces or sells.237
Brand manufacturers face additional possible lawsuits for millions or
even billions of dollars in damages in class-action or mass-tort cases
where generic versions of brand-name drugs caused injury either postrelease or during bioequivalence testing. Accordingly, brand
manufacturers sometimes face a confusing landscape of liabilities for
products they do not manufacture, for errors they did not cause, and for
actions of companies they do not control. From a business standpoint,
these liability issues are real, and giving drug samples to generic
manufacturers provides absolutely no benefit to the brand manufacturer.
So long as these liability issues remain murky, the possibility for severe
financial consequences with no countervailing business-related benefits
justifies a wide range of exclusionary behavior.
234. The Threat of ‘Innovator Liability,’ WALL ST. J. (Mar. 13, 2013, 7:12 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323628804578346231780434760; see also
Victor E. Schwartz et al., Warning: Shifting Liability to Manufacturers of Brand-Name
Medicines When the Harm Was Allegedly Caused by Generic Drugs Has Severe Side Effects, 81
FORDHAM L. REV. 1835, 1870–71 (2013) (“[Innovator] liability is certain to create new and
significant financial pressures on brand-name drugs, the effects of which would harm health care
consumers. . . . Ironically, some plaintiffs have argued that manufacturers of brand-name drugs
can never escape competitor liability, even by withdrawing from the market, saying that the basis
for liability can be the representations made when educating physicians about their drugs during
the period of exclusivity. . . . [I]t will become riskier for brand-name manufacturers to dedicate
resources to researching and developing potentially life-saving or life-improving medicines,
particularly when those medicines have greater health risks or are for small communities of
people that will not drive large revenues.”).
235. Kellogg v. Wyeth, 762 F. Supp. 2d 694, 709 (D. Vt. 2010).
236. See Schwartz et al., supra note 234, at 1870–71 (“[T]he fear of such liability would
likely drive many brand-name manufacturers from a drug’s market once it becomes available in
generic form. . . . Should the brand-name manufacturer prematurely withdraw from the market
over liability, consumers will have lost the company most familiar with a medicine and the one
that likely has the greatest infrastructure and resources to facilitate postmarket research and
analysis into any late developing safety issues with a drug.”).
237. See id. at 1870 (discussing some plaintiffs’ argument that “manufacturers of brandname drugs can never escape competitor liability, even by withdrawing from the market”).
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Brand manufacturers’ liability is the most outstanding issue and also
the one Congress could most easily remedy; legislators could address the
issue with a statutory liability shield to protect brand manufacturers from
possible liability for generic drugs. The FDA could also take a more
active role in clarifying these issues. Absent those actions, limiting the
development of generics for the most dangerous drugs is necessary to
avoid these likely liabilities and protect brand manufacturers from
lawsuits. The ETASU restrictions are a signal that brand manufacturers
need to tread lightly and ensure that they closely restrict and supervise
any drug distribution. Generic alternatives represent a substantial risk for
brand manufacturers and, thus, the brand manufacturers’ refusals to
provide REMS-restricted drug samples represent another valid business
justification.
3. Health and Safety: Generic Drugs Pose Potential Medical
Risks to Patients and Reputational Harm to Brands
Evidence is mounting that generic drugs may not always be as
“identical” to the brand-name drug as the statutes require—something
even the FDA has admitted in isolated cases.238 Some have speculated
that generic drugs do not consistently perform as well as their brand
counterparts and that these differences may pose acute health risks in
certain drug categories or in certain high-risk patients.239
Moreover, generic drug labels frequently differ from the brand-name
labels. One study indicates that over two-thirds of generic labeling did
not conform to the brand-name drug’s labeling, as regulations require.240
Mislabeled drugs can pose severe health risks if the omission of
contraindications, allergies, and side effects from the label causes
238. See, e.g., Katie Thomas, An Increase in Scrutiny for Generics, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/01/business/fda-increases-scrutiny-of-some-genericdrugs.html (“[T]he F.D.A. took the rare step of conducting its own study of the 300-milligram
strength [after adverse reports started piling up on long-release versions of some generic drugs].
In early October, it announced that the drug did not, in fact, perform as well as the brand.”).
239. For an argument by one pharmacologist, Joe Graedon, see id. ( “[T]here’s still a cloud
hanging over generic drugs . . . . This may be far more common than the F.D.A. had realized.”).
240. See Jon Duke, Jeff Friedlin & Xiaochun Li, Consistency in the Safety Labeling of
Bioequivalent Medications, 22 PHARMACOEPIDEMIOLOGY & DRUG SAFETY 294 (2013),
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/pds.3351/pdf (noting that “68% of multimanufacturer drugs had discrepancies in ADR labeling” and that “[d]espite FDA mandate,
bioequivalent drugs often differ in their safety labeling”); see also Emma Hitt, Safety Info for
Generic Drugs Often Differs from Brand Label, MEDSCAPE MED. NEWS (Dec. 18, 2012),
http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/776347 (“Generic drugs often differ from brand name
drugs in their safety labeling despite standards mandated by the [FDA] . . . .”). The extent of the
health risks from this revelation is unclear, but mislabeled drugs certainly carry a heightened risk
of being prescribed incorrectly. See id.
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doctors to mistakenly prescribe drugs to vulnerable patients. The list of
evidence and clinical trials revealing adverse effects and harmful
medical results from generic substitution is growing. One study focusing
on Narrow Therapeutic Index drugs (NTI drugs)—those with “small
differences between therapeutic and toxic doses”—found that:
there are patient safety concerns with [bioequivalence],
especially for NTI drugs. NTI drugs have some challenges
for clinical safety and efficacy when generic substitutions
are introduced. From an economic perspective, the
immediate cost savings of generic substitution for NTI
drugs is not worth the cost of increased probability of
hospitalization or adverse health effects.241
Another study, which used a large Canadian dataset, found specific
and acute health risks from a number of generic formulations including
“increased seizure frequency, morbidity, and use of health care services,
with a number of patients requiring a switch back to their previous
formulation.”242 Although few studies have examined the subject thus
far, there are other examples of health and safety risks posed by generic
versions of brand-name drugs. 243 REMS-restricted drugs with ETASU
are potentially dangerous drugs that pose valid safety concerns to
patients.
241. See Michelle Hottinger & Bryan A. Liang, Deficiencies of the FDA in Evaluating
Generic Formulations: Addressing Narrow Therapeutic Index Drugs, 38 AM. J.L. & MED. 667,
669, 685 (2012).
242. Bernhard J. Steinhoff et al., Substitution of Anticonvulsant Drugs, 5 THERAPEUTICS &
CLINICAL RISK MGMT. 449, 455 (2009), available at www.dovepress.com/getfile.
php?fileID=4977 (including an additional reference to an investigation into antiepileptic drugs
(AED), which found a “large body of unpublished, anecdotal evidence that substitution of
[generic] AED formulations was associated with efficacy or safety issues . . . [and] was highly
suggestive of a link between generic substitution and adverse effects”).
243. The American Academy of Neurology, which represents 19,000 neurologists, issued a
position statement that “opposes generic substitution of anticonvulsant drugs for the treatment of
epilepsy without the attending physician’s approval.” Position Statement on the Coverage of
Anticonvulsant Drugs for the Treatment of Epilepsy, AM. ACAD. OF NEUROLOGY (Nov. 2006),
https://www.aan.com/uploadedFiles/Website_Library_Assets/Documents/6.Public_Policy/1.St
ay_Informed/2.Position_statements/3.PDFs_of_all_Position_Statements/anticonv.pdf (noting
that the FDA allows for significant variation between brand-name and generic drugs and that
even small differences “can result in breakthrough seizures”). Some commentators have noted
the differences between the FDA’s bioequivalence standard and therapeutic equivalence. See,
e.g., Melissa Healy, FDA Standards Are Questioned, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2008),
http://articles.latimes.com/2008/mar/17/health/he-genericside17 (“[T]he FDA permits a generic
drug to release 80% to 125% of an active ingredient into the bloodstream . . . . [M]edical and
pharmacology specialists warn that the FDA’s range may be too broad for some drugs, especially
in cases where a drug has a ‘narrow therapeutic index’—the fine line between an ineffective dose
and a dangerous one.”).
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Adverse effects caused by differences in brand-name versus generic
drugs can harm the reputation of the brand manufacturer despite lack of
any fault. Consumers often do not distinguish between the brand name
of a drug and the generic version, and will unjustly hold the brand
manufacturer responsible for mistakes of the generic manufacturer.244
Any difference between the brand and the generic may open the door to
generic products liability, but adverse events arising from generic
versions of brand-name drugs may have an equal or disproportionate
impact on the reputation of the brand name, harming future sales and
confidence in the brand manufacturer.245
Two important aspects of any pharmaceutical business model are
managing potential health and safety risks, and taking a precautionary
approach by limiting the distribution of drug samples to medically
approved practitioners. Accordingly, these health risks are a valid
business justification for brand manufacturers’ refusal to deal with
generic manufacturers.
III. ERROR COSTS AND ANTITRUST INTERVENTION
The Supreme Court has recognized that business entities have a broad
and robust right to refuse to deal with their rivals. This right comes from
a strong concern about Type I errors246 and over-enforcement of the
antitrust laws, which could lead to harmful legal rules that deter
244. See generally Schwartz et al., supra note 234 (discussing court decisions related to
brand manufacturer liability for mistakes of the generic manufacturer).
245. The relevant economic literature indicates that companies use brand names to
differentiate their products and signal to consumers that they have invested in quality and
excellence. See Benjamin Klein, Brand Names, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS
42, 42–43 (3d ed. 2008). Consumers pay more for brands because the familiarity of the brand
indicates consumer confidence in the product. See id. at 43 (“When it is difficult to determine
the quality of a product before purchase and the consequences of poor quality are significant, it
makes economic sense for consumers to rely on brand names and the company reputations
associated with them. By paying more for a brand-name product in those circumstances,
consumers are not acting irrationally. . . . A company’s high reputation indicates not only that
the company has performed well in the past, but also that it will perform well in the future because
it has an economic incentive to maintain and improve the quality of its products. A consumer
who pays a high price for a brand-name product is paying for the assurance of increased
quality.”). Consumers often have difficulty understanding the differences in pharmaceutical
brand and generic versions and are confused about the way the entire industry works. See Carol
Rados, Drug Name Confusion: Preventing Medication Errors, MEDICINENET.COM,
http://www.medicinenet.com/script/main/art.asp?articlekey=53208 (last editorial review Nov.
10, 2005) (indicating that confusion between different forms of drug names is common and
sometimes causes serious side effects).
246. See Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright, Innovation and the Limits of Antitrust, 6
J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 153, 158–59 (2010) (describing Type I errors as false positives and
Type II errors as false negatives).
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procompetitive business behavior247—a major concern in REMS
cases.248 Embedded in the principles of error costs is a concern that the
realities of the competitive marketplace check the actions of monopolies
and dominant firms, but poor legal rules that condemn or sanction
procompetitive business behavior have no check.249 All things equal, the
harms of the latter are greater than the harms of the former. Judge Frank
Easterbrook expressed this theory in his article The Limits of Antitrust
where he stated that:
If the court errs by condemning a beneficial practice, the
benefits may be lost for good. Any other firm that uses the
condemned practice faces sanctions in the name of stare
decisis, no matter the benefits. If the court errs by permitting
a deleterious practice, though, the welfare loss decreases
over time. Monopoly is self-destructive. Monopoly prices
eventually attract entry. True, this long run may be a long
time coming, . . . [b]ut this should not obscure the point:
judicial errors that tolerate baleful practices are selfcorrecting, while erroneous condemnations are not.250
Viewed through the lens of the error-cost framework, antitrust
intervention in the REMS context would be more costly to competition
and consumer welfare than allowing market forces and existing
regulatory oversight to settle the dispute. The likely decision-theoretic
outcome and the correct presumption to apply in the case of forced
sharing of REMS-restricted drugs is that antitrust intervention will be
destructive for several reasons. First, a new exception to the refusal-todeal doctrine will adversely impact pharmaceutical market incentives
and consumer welfare. Second, endorsing a new exception to the refusalto-deal doctrine will diverge from the antitrust presumption to avoid
uncertainty and confusion in the marketplace. Third, existing FDA
regulatory oversight precludes a policy supporting contradictory
antitrust obligations.
247. See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
414 (2004) (“Mistaken inferences and the resulting false condemnations ‘are especially costly,
because they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect.’ The cost of false
positives counsels against an undue expansion of § 2 liability.” (citation omitted) (quoting
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986))).
248. Some academics have acknowledged that Type I errors are an even bigger problem in
innovation-type industries than in other cases. See Manne & Wright, supra note 246, at 164–66.
“From an error-cost perspective, the fundamental problem is that economists have had a
longstanding tendency to ascribe anticompetitive explanations to new forms of conduct that are
not well understood.” Id. at 164.
249. See id. at 159 (discussing the connection between the error-cost framework and
monopolization).
250. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1984).
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A. Generic Entry Jeopardizes Consumer Welfare and Patient
Health Because of Reductions in Drug Capitalization,
Communication, Marketing, and Reporting
There is a general consensus in the literature that the overall price of
a drug falls as generics enter the market. The benefits of generic
competition to consumers are well-documented in terms of price,251 but
other results are less clear. Much research finds that the price of brandname drugs may stay steady or increase after generic entry occurs.252
This conclusion indicates that some consumers are infra-marginal and
that, for many consumers, brand-name drugs are inelastic. Moreover,
many studies find that the overall sales volume of combined generic and
brand-name drugs typically falls steeply after the generics enter the
market, likely because of reduced advertising and marketing.253 The
implications of these facts are not to be understated. The FTC insists that
generic entry is an unqualified benefit to consumers because of the cost
savings of lower priced drugs, but consumer welfare is a calculus of
price, output, and quality. Decreases in advertising and marketing
indicate that the overall consumption of drugs and consumer access to
pharmaceuticals may drop because of earlier generic entry.254 This drop
251. This literature is extensive. See, e.g., Henry Grabowski & John Vernon, Longer Patents
for Increased Generic Competition in the US: The Waxman-Hatch Act After One Decade, 10
PHARMACOECONOMICS 110, 121 (1996), http://fds.duke.edu/db/attachment/467 (determining that
the Hatch–Waxman Act has successfully encouraged generic-drug entry by changing the mix of
generic integration from around 10% in the mid-1980s to nearly 40% in the mid-1990s).
252. See, e.g., Ernst R. Berndt, Margaret K. Kyle & Davina C. Ling, The Long Shadow of
Patent Expiration: Generic Entry and Rx-to-OTC Switches, NAT’L BUREAU ECON. RESEARCH
229, 249 (Jan. 2003), http://www.nber.org/chapters/c9737.pdf.
253. Empirical studies of the results of generic entry on market prices and overall quantity
of drugs sold have found mixed results, but the general trend is that brands abandon advertising
and marketing and that the amount of drugs sold decreases as generics enter the market. For an
article highlighting case study evidence that this drop is likely related to decreases in brand
manufacturer advertising and marketing of drug products, see Peter J. Huckfeldt & Christopher
R. Knittel, Pharmaceutical Use Following Generic Entry: Paying Less and Buying Less 2–3
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17046, 2011), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w17046 (finding also that overall drug utilization rates drop two
years before generic entry and continue to drop after entry occurs). Another paper similarly finds
that generic entry leads to drops in advertising, marketing, and overall reductions in brand-name
and generic drug sales. See Berndt, Kyle & Ling, supra note 252, at 244–51. Additionally,
another paper finds that overall drug utilization and advertising decline after generic entry. See
Richard E. Caves, Michael D. Whinston & Mark A. Hurwitz, Patent Expiration, Entry, and
Competition in the U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry, BROOKINGS PAPERS: MICROECONOMICS 26–
30, 37–42 (1991), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Projects/BPEA/1991%20micro/1991_
bpeamicro_caves.PDF (finding also that brand-name drug prices rise immediately before generic
entry but then fall modestly after entry).
254. This issue is complicated because the use of more drugs is not always beneficial.
Typically, classical economics regards output increases of any good as consumer welfare
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in the quantity of sales, combined with the possible quality and efficacy
issues discussed above, severely complicates the consumer welfare
conclusions of the FTC. Lower prices are desirable, but drug utilization
rates and access to the healthcare system may suffer. This implies that
endorsing an antitrust rule that has, at best, ambiguous effects on
consumer welfare is bad policy.
Another important consideration is that the REMS restrictions,
especially the ETASU, are applied only to drugs that require more
careful distribution and use. Many of the REMS restrictions are focused
closely on increasing communication and the dissemination of
information between pharmaceutical companies, doctors, and
patients.255 ETASU requirements focus on monitoring, reporting, and
evaluating the use of dangerous drugs.256 These requirements share
common themes of high costs and intensive labor. Generic
manufacturers are often undercapitalized and may lack the resources to
adequately implement the REMS restrictions.257 Doctors frequently
complain about the lack of communication and involvement from
generic manufacturers, and generic manufacturers almost never contact
physicians in any capacity.258 A related concern is that the same federal
preemption laws discussed above, which shield generic manufacturers
enhancing, but obviously drugs need to be prescribed accordingly by doctors. There is substantial
academic literature on the issue of overmedication. See, e.g., Wim J. van der Steen, Assessing
Overmedication: Biology, Philosophy and Common Sense, 51 ACTA BIOTHEORETICA 151 (2003),
available at http://download.springer.com/static/pdf/372/art%253A10.1023%252FA%
253A1025119821313.pdf?auth6=1421120696_feef85b00339b4b3dabd238ba3d124c6&ext=.pd
f (discussing the connection between overmedication and the pharmaceutical industry). This Article
raises the issue merely to highlight that the consumer welfare effects are ambiguous,
complicated, and not nearly as cut-and-dry as some might indicate. Nevertheless, a full
discussion of the economics of pharmaceutical consumer welfare is beyond the scope of this
Article.
255. Soller & Vogt, supra note 23.
256. Id.
257. Katie Thomas, Generic Drug Makers See a Drought Ahead, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/04/business/generic-drug-makers-facing-squeeze-onrevenue.html (indicating that the initial “patent cliff” has dried up and that robust competition in
the generic markets has severely limited profit margins, forcing generic manufacturers to either
branch out into branded markets, specialize, or aim for larger international markets); see also
William Hubbard, The Debilitating Effect of Exclusive Rights: Patents and Productive
Inefficiency, 66 FLA. L. REV. 2045, 2046–47 (2014) (discussing other downfalls of the
pharmaceutical industry and the harm this causes to cunsumers).
258. See LINDA L. BARRETT, AARP, PHYSICIANS’ ATTITUDES AND PRACTICES REGARDING
GENERIC DRUGS 12 (2005), available at http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/health/phys_generic.pdf
(“[R]epresentatives of generic drugs manufacturers are less likely to visit or dispense samples.
Three in four (74 %) physicians say they or their practice has never been visited by a
representative of a generic drug manufacturer and they are equally likely (76%) to say they have
not received samples of generic drugs.”).
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from tort liability, may also prevent the updating of drug labels to
incorporate newly discovered health risks.259 This problem is enhanced
when generic manufacturers are the sole source of many drugs because
the branded version drops out of the market after generic entry makes
participation unprofitable.260
In the case of REMS with ETASU, the most dangerous drugs may go
without adequate follow-up and evaluation if generic versions enter the
market. Consequently, physicians might mishandle subsequent reports
of adverse effects or prescribe drugs in instances that jeopardize patients’
health. Both possibilities, albeit hypothetical, should bear weight in the
consideration of whether the refusal to provide drug samples is
reasonable. Potential harm to consumer welfare from reduced utilization,
decreased communication, and inadequate post-prescription review all
justify brand manufacturers’ reluctance to aid in the development of
generic alternatives. While the REMS restrictions are common among
pharmaceuticals, the ETASU restrictions are limited to a small fraction
of brand-name drugs and represent a rational regulatory response to
dangerous side effects. Accelerating entry of generic versions
jeopardizes the safe and effective administration of these restrictions.
B. A New Judicially Crafted Antitrust Exception Would Amplify
Uncertainty over the REMS Program and Would Risk Depressing
Pharmaceutical Investment
The REMS restrictions are new and lack regulatory clarity, creating
an environment where brand manufacturers are legitimately uncertain
about their obligations and potential liabilities.261 Refusal to aid generic
259. Inability of Generic Drug Manufacturers to Warn of Newly Discovered Hazards Puts
Patients at Risk; Serious Safety Hazards Often Take Years to Emerge, PUBLIC CITIZEN (June 24,
2013), http://www.citizen.org/pressroom/pressroomredirect.cfm?ID=3922 (quoting Dr. Michael
Carome to emphasize that “[g]eneric drug manufacturers’ inability under current regulations to
update the labeling of their products poses a threat to the safety of prescription drugs, creating
unnecessary risks to patients”).
260. PUBLIC CITIZEN, GENERIC DRUG LABELING: A REPORT ON SERIOUS WARNINGS ADDED
TO APPROVED DRUGS AND ON GENERIC DRUGS MARKETED WITHOUT A BRAND-NAME
EQUIVALENT 1 (2013), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/2138.pdf (“For those
drugs, patients and physicians cannot rely on the brand-name manufacturer to monitor reports of
adverse effects and update the labeling.”).
261. See
generally
REMS:
The
New
Reality,
CAMPBELLALLIANCE,
http://www.campbellalliance.com/articles/campbell_alliance_REMS_article.pdf (last visited
May 1, 2015). This uncertainty is a common thread in all industry discussion of REMS. See, e.g.,
Jill Wechsler, REMS Raise Concerns for Biotech Products, BIOPHARMINTERNATIONAL (Apr. 1,
2010), http://www.biopharminternational.com/node/221970 (noting that REMSs have created
“uncertainty among manufacturers as to what information the agency wants, and when”) There
have been substantial “delays in providing needed guidance for industry and in answering many
questions about how to implement REMS procedures,” and “[a] main source of confusion for
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entry for REMS-restricted drugs is a method of limiting this uncertainty.
Uncertainty over REMS compliance is a major concern in the
pharmaceutical industry. One medical contract research organization
conducted a study of the REMS program and concluded that REMSs are
“still an area of uncertainty, confusion, and concern for many
sponsors.”262 Because of this uncertainty, the REMS programs are likely
to be increasingly the target of pharmaceutical litigation, mass-tort cases,
and potential class actions. The REMS and ETASU programs cover the
most dangerous drugs on the market and thus will be connected to a
disproportionate number of adverse events and lawsuits.
Many specifics of the regulatory obligations and implementation of
the REMS program remain murky. While compliance for one company
is confusing, the joint-REMS requirements for drugs with both brandname and generic versions are also unclear. Expounding on these very
issues, the brand manufacturer Prometheus Laboratories filed a citizen’s
petition to the FDA asking for clarification.263 The citizen’s petition
notes that: (1) the FDA’s single joint REMS program, which requires
cooperation with any generic manufacturer, “will be scrutinized by the
[FTC] for antitrust issues and likely the plaintiff’s bar in the context of
product liability litigation” ; (2) many REMS program developments are
costly and require substantial investment and there is no guidance on
how those costs should be shared between the brand and generic
manufacturers; and (3) there is no guidance on standards for how REMS
programs should be “designed or modified after approval” because any
agreement “will be subject to state court review in determining liability
in a state tort failure to warn case.”264 The common theme of this
complaint is that the FDA’s silence is creating a marketplace of
uncertainty where liabilities, risks, and costs of the REMS program are
high.265 This uncertainty in the pharmaceutical regulatory environment
makes investment in the industry risky and less attractive to drug
manufacturers. The likely result is depressed research and development
budgets and reduced innovation—a socially harmful outcome.
More clearly, should brand manufacturers be saddled with the
affirmative duty to provide samples of REMS-restricted drugs to a
generic competitor, there is a danger that research and development, as
manufacturers is when to start discussing the need for a REMS with the FDA and what kind of
information the agency wants to see.” Id.
262. Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS) and the Impact on Opioid
Analgesics, PREMIER RESEARCH, http://premier-research.com/images/uploads/REMS_White_
Paper_April_2010.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2015).
263. PROMETHEUS THERAPEUTICS, CITIZEN PETITION, No. FDA-2013-P-0572 (May 10,
2013), available at http://freepdfhosting.com/6d7631c7c7.pdf [hereinafter PROMETHEUS CITIZEN
PETITION].
264. Id. at 11–12.
265. See id. at 7–8.
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well as marketing of the drug, becomes unappealing to the brand
manufacturer. The risks associated with providing the samples, or the
costs associated with ensuring that the generic will properly handle the
drug, may be too high to undertake. This, in turn, would remove the
product from the market, and harm consumers by limiting their choices.
Refusing to provide drug samples to generic manufacturers is, therefore,
a reasonable means of controlling a brand manufacturer’s business
calculus by avoiding the confusion of unclear joint REMS programs, and
a reasonable step toward avoiding the uncertainty of managing REMS
compliance where there are multiple actors.
C. Concern over Type I Errors and Conflicting Regulatory Regimes
Necessitates a Presumption Against Antitrust Intervention
Antitrust liability is not necessary in REMS cases because the
Supreme Court in Trinko provided guidelines that limit the role of
antitrust when there are alternative regulatory or statutory schemes
involved.266 Congress often crafts policy goals that diverge substantially
from those of the antitrust laws. When the statutory framework
promoting these goals is clearly articulated and overseen by a regulatory
agency, it should be generally assumed that the agency has the discretion
and right to oversee its own statutory scheme—even if those outcomes
diverge from the expectations of antitrust policy.267 This approach to
antitrust law precludes the need for a new exception to the duty-to-deal
jurisprudence.
Trinko clearly establishes that violations of a regulatory scheme—the
Telecommunications Act in that case—could not be the basis of an
antitrust claim.268 Similarly, in the REMS context it is unlikely that a
court would infer an antitrust violation from violations of the Hatch–
Waxman Act, the Leahy–Smith America Invents Act (the most recent
Patent Act), or abuse of the FDAAA. It is also unclear whether brand
manufacturers are in violation of any of those statutory schemes.
Although the congressional language in the FDAAA mandates that
brand manufacturers are not allowed to “block or delay approval” of
ANDAs,269 the language does not impose a clear obligation to facilitate
generic manufacture or provide samples. Congress and the FDA have
had chances to change that language and, to date, have not done so.
Additionally, this system is closely regulated and overseen by
Congress, the FDA, and the Patent and Trademark Office. Congress has
266. See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
412 (2004).
267. Id. at 412.
268. Id. at 415–16.
269. 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(f)(8) (2012).
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entered the realm of healthcare legislation multiple times before and after
passage of the Hatch–Waxman Act,270 which indicates that the current
legislation is not a mere oversight. With a lack of a clear statutory duty
and at least these three decision-making bodies involved in future
regulation, the courts should feel safe that this is an area where antitrust
is assuredly unnecessary to clarify parties’ obligations. Evidently, the
FDA is the most appropriate agency with the most relevant knowledge
to settle this dispute, and citizens’ petitions have requested that the FDA
do just that.271 Accordingly, the court should make it clear that it has no
role in this dispute and that the FTC has no authority to interpret
congressional regulation of the pharmaceutical industry.
Similar to the local exchange carrier in Trinko, brand manufacturers
have no duty to deal with rivals. No persuasive case has been made that
providing drug samples should be an exception to this rule. There are
multiple extensive regulatory frameworks and federal agencies involved
in overseeing the pharmaceutical industry, and generic manufacturers
have a clearly defined administrative remedy that does not require the
crafting of new antitrust liabilities; the available remedy is petitioning
the FDA to commence an enforcement action.272 Given these facts, the
standards from Trinko indicate that antitrust liability does not follow
from a refusal to provide drug samples for bioequivalence testing.
A more substantive application of existing refusal-to-deal
jurisprudence indicates that there are many reasons to reject new antitrust
obligations. Among others, there is no prior course of dealings between
the brand and generic manufacturers because they are potential
competitors. A prior course of dealing may provide a way to evaluate the
potential economic harms or benefits resulting from conduct.273 Basic
common sense indicates that generic entry will not benefit a brand
manufacturer in the long run.274 While this lack of benefit does not
excuse a brand manufacturer for restricting all sales to generics in all
circumstances (e.g., when a drug is not REMS-restricted), it does support
a policy of not establishing a new exception to the well-recognized
competitor’s right to refuse to deal. To be sure, the FDA’s direct
oversight of REMS-restricted drugs makes it unlikely that a brand
manufacturer could easily establish REMSs for a drug to avoid
270. See generally Natalie Pous, Shifting the Balance Between Branded and Generic
Pharmaceutical Companies: Amendments to Hatch-Waxman Past, Present, and Future, 19 FED.
CIR. B.J. 301 (2009) (discussing the Hatch–Waxman Act, its background, and the subsequent
congressional attempts to amend it).
271. See, e.g., PROMETHEUS CITIZEN PETITION, supra note 263.
272. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2).
273. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
274. See supra notes 251–54 and accompanying text.
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distribution of samples to potential generic rivals. Also, the alleged
behavior involves exclusion within the scope of a validly obtained patent
in an industry where the patent structure is generally considered well
implemented. A patent holder’s protection of her own intellectual
property is generally considered a procompetitive justification for
exclusionary conduct.275 Crafting antitrust exceptions to these wellestablished rules carries a distinct possibility for overbroad applications
beyond a narrowly tailored exception.
Forcing a patent holder to participate in and expedite the entry of
generic competition before the expiration of the patent date has the
potential to decrease the length and value of pharmaceutical patents,
which will deter investment and ultimately limit innovation industrywide. Again, case law is clear that absent exceptional circumstances
there is no obligation to deal with rivals.276 An antitrust rule supporting
the opposite proposition—introducing a new obligation to deal in the
REMS context—might be broadly interpreted to limit the value and use
of intellectual property when even the agencies have suggested that
antitrust and IP “share the common purpose of promoting innovation and
enhancing consumer welfare.”277 Relatedly and more importantly,
forcing the patent holder to provide REMS-restricted drug samples to
generic manufacturers risks harm to consumers: it reduces incentives for
the brand manufacturer to provide the REMS-restricted drug in the first
place because doing so would raise the brand manufacturer’s risk, and
thus its operating costs, to a point of economic infeasibility.278
Context for the Supreme Court’s approach to generic drugs, and how
it might respond to brand manufacturers’ refusals to deal in the context
of REMS-restricted drugs, can be extrapolated from the FTC v. Actavis,
Inc.279 case where the competitive concerns of the pharmaceutical
industry were most recently addressed.280 The Supreme Court evaluated
a potentially collusive agreement where a generic manufacturer agreed
to settle a Hatch–Waxman paragraph IV patent challenge with a brandname drug.281 The Court determined that the competitive concerns were
275. See, e.g., Benjamin Klein & John Shepard Wiley Jr., Competitive Price Discrimination
as an Antitrust Justification for Intellectual Property Refusals to Deal, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 599,
600 (2003) (discussing “the Federal Circuit’s premise . . . that it is not necessary to undertake a
fact-based inquiry into a patent holder’s business justifications for its refusal to deal”).
276. See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 408–09.
277. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE
LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 2 (1995).
278. See Henry Grabowski et al., Does Generic Entry Always Increase Consumer Welfare?,
67 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 373, 384–85 (2012).
279. 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
280. See id. at 2227.
281. Id. at 2227–29.
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both exclusionary and collusive, as the settlement was potentially
anticompetitive in preventing generic entry and deterring other generic
challenges to the drug.282 Despite the FTC’s desire to apply a
presumptively unlawful rule to these agreements, a rule that puts a thumb
on the scale in favor of illegality, the Court held that reverse payments
should be evaluated under the rule of reason.283 The presumption and
development of antitrust law generally holds that agreements between
competitors are more suspect than single-firm conduct.284
Comparing these agreements to refusal-to-deal cases, a presumption
arises from the nature of the basic conduct that a more stringent rule or
condemnation from federal courts than the one applied in Actavis is
unlikely. Although similar competitive concerns are at play, it is hard to
find a refusal to sell a patented drug to a potential competitor who has
no clear statutory right to access that intellectual property more suspect
than an agreement between those competitors to avoid competition and
share the resulting monopoly profits. The Actavis case is more like the
latter situation than the former, although plenty of these settlements may
be procompetitive or benign. A refusal to deal is certainly a more settled
area of antitrust law, where the basic rule is that no obligation to deal
exists.285 Refusals to cooperate are often telltale signs of fierce
competition. The simple conclusion is that an agreement between
competitors is far more likely to raise competitive concerns than a refusal
to agree. If pay-for-delay cases receive the rule of reason, then a refusal to
cooperate should likely be per se legal or analyzed under a searching inquiry
similar to the rule of reason.
Finally, the FTC’s amicus brief begs the question of why the FTC is
involved in this case at all.286 The FTC brings less knowledge than the
FDA to the areas of regulatory pharmaceutical policy, even if the
Commission has prepared reports and studied competition including
incentives in this area.287 The FTC seems to be grasping at proverbial
section 2 straws with its antitrust arguments. The Commission even hit
on the shortcomings of its own arguments when it pointed to language
in Trinko stating that antitrust analysis should “reflect the distinctive
economic and legal setting of the regulated industry to which it

282. Id. at 2229.
283. Id. at 2236.
284. See, e.g., Terazosin Hydrochlorid Antitrust Litig., 352 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1313 (S.D.
Fla. 2005).
285. See, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 597
(1985).
286. See supra note 104.
287. FTC Actelion Brief, supra note 6, at 2–3.
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applies.”288 The FTC attempted to argue that this language supported the
idea that the pharmaceutical industry was designed to strongly support
generic drug development,289 but it ignored the simple distinction that
the pharmaceutical industry is already heavily regulated, is frequently
directed by congressional legislation, and already functions efficiently
without arbitrary antitrust liabilities.
IV. A SUGGESTED ANTITRUST ANALYSIS
If the courts determine that antitrust analysis is appropriate, then
refusals to deal in the REMS context should be evaluated under the
profit-sacrifice test. This Part argues that although other theories of
antitrust liability such as the essential-facilities doctrine or unfair
methods of competition under section 5 of the FTC Act have been
suggested as appropriate tools for addressing this conduct, courts should
not adopt these frameworks.
A. The Profit-Sacrifice Test Is the Appropriate Antitrust
Standard for Refusals to Provide Brand-Name Drug Samples to
Generic Manufacturers
Antitrust is rarely the answer in heavily regulated industries where an
independent regulatory body or congressional action can obviate the
need for an antitrust obligation or liability.290 Congress has had multiple
chances to refine the language of the FDAAA and the FDA has had
ample time to weigh in on and settle the issue. In the absence of action
from either authority, it is imprudent to arbitrarily impose an antitrust
obligation, as the FTC stated, merely because Congress “considered
legislative proposals that would have created a more explicit statutory
requirement.”291 Actions that Congress merely contemplated do not
sway in favor of a statute’s interpretation. Even the FTC has admitted
that Congress “has rejected proposals that would have provided for more
explicit statutory obligations.”292
Moreover, the FTC’s briefs ignore crucial comparisons that weigh
strongly against imposing a new duty to deal. Although Trinko
288. Id. at 17 (quoting Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP,
540 U.S. 398, 411 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
289. Id.
290. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and Innovation: Where We Are and Where We
Should Be Going, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 749, 754 (2011). (“[A]ntitrust is not the exclusive protector
of competition in innovation intensive markets. Many competition issues can be addressed more
effectively through the IP statutes themselves, either alone or in addition to prudent application
of the antitrust laws.”).
291. FTC Actelion Brief, supra note 6, at 15.
292. Id. at 16.
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recognizes the language of Aspen Skiing that the right to refuse to deal is
not “unqualified,”293 the remaining question is what the appropriate test
is to determine the narrow exceptions to the right to refuse to deal.294 The
intended manner of applying of section 2 remains unsettled, as nailing
down the anticompetitive standard has proven difficult. This is because
“the behavior at issue in cases alleging monopolization by exclusion of
competitors necessarily will often be quite difficult to distinguish from
the vigorous rivalry that antitrust law seeks to promote.”295 Nevertheless,
should courts reach the merits of Actelion or other similar cases on a
section 2 antitrust claim, the profit-sacrifice test is ultimately the
appropriate standard for evaluating refusals to provide brand-name drug
samples to generic manufacturers. As explained previously, under the
profit-sacrifice test, conduct is anticompetitive only if the defendant has
no legitimate business purpose for the conduct or it is unprofitable in the
short run and makes business sense only if a rival is excluded, leaving
the defendant with a supracompetitive recoupment in the long run.296
The profit-sacrifice test “asks whether the conduct is profitable to the
defendant in light of its (incremental) costs and . . . benefits” and
“whether the conduct enabled the defendant to gain additional market
power or a dangerous probability thereof.”297 Again, the test sets a high
bar for finding a defendant liable for an antitrust violation.
Although at least one prominent antitrust scholar has attacked the
viability and usefulness of the profit-sacrifice test,298 this test is
consistent with Otter Tail, Aspen Skiing, and Trinko and is the likely
antitrust inquiry a court would make in these pharmaceutical cases.
293. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408
(2004).
294. Trinko has also been affirmed and extended by Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. Linkline
Communications, Inc., where the Court “reaffirmed the rights of parties to refuse to deal, saying
further that the ‘instances in which a dominant firm may incur antitrust liability for purely
unilateral conduct’ are ‘rare.’” Creighton & Jacobson, supra note 127, at 51 (quoting Pac. Bell
Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 448 (2009)).
295. Susan A. Creighton et al., Cheap Exclusion, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 975, 978–79, 979 n.17
(2005) (finding that any sophisticated analysis requires a careful balancing of Type I and Type
II errors, with particular concern for avoiding false positives).
296. Melamed, supra note 172, at 389.
297. Id. at 389–90.
298. See Steven C. Salop, Exclusionary Conduct, Effect on Consumers, and the Flawed
Profit-Sacrifice Standard, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 311, 326 (2006) (“[T]he analysis [is] circular and
the standard an empty shell.”). Professor Steven Salop’s position hinges on the idea that this
standard is complex and requires the court to perform predictive economics by constructing a
hypothetical market and subjectively assessing “the defendant’s likely conduct in the
hypothetical absence of an ability to raise prices.” Id. at 358. Professor Salop instead suggests a
standard consumer-welfare test that inquires into legitimate business justifications of the alleged
conduct and the effect such actions would have on consumers. Id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016

47

Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 3 [2016], Art. 1

1024

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

Attorneys Susan Creighton and Jonathan Jacobson explain:
In Otter Tail, the refusal to sell to rivals at the same price as
the defendant was selling to everyone else was a distinction
based solely on the character of the customer and was
profitable only because of the negative effects on the
customer-rivals. In Aspen [Skiing], the refusal to accept
Highlands’ tickets at par or its cash-like vouchers was
equally based solely on the character of the payer and
otherwise made no sense. . . . Trinko involved no such facts,
and that allowed the defendant to prevail. . . . No economic
sense, then, was an important or controlling basis for
illegality in Otter Tail [and] Aspen [Skiing]. . . and a
decision that would make economic sense in a competitive
market excused the denial of access in Trinko.299
They conclude this discussion by noting that forcing a monopolist to
provide access to its assets poses a threat to future investment in the
industry and may harm consumer welfare in the long run.300
The brand manufacturers’ refusals to provide REMS-restricted drug
samples to generic manufacturers would survive the profit-sacrifice test.
First, apart from a single and limited one-time sale of drug samples,
brand manufacturers are not sacrificing any profits. There is no clear
evidence of any economic harm, long-term or short-term, from the
refusal to sell. The FTC brief latched onto the profit-sacrifice language
from Aspen Skiing to argue three separate times that the refused drug
sales would have been made at retail price and, thus, constitute a sacrifice
of profits.301 At best, this argument is misleading. Although the generic
manufacturers have offered to purchase the drug samples at full price,
these requests are only for samples to conduct a single clinical study for
bioequivalence testing. Although it is unclear exactly what sales volume
this would constitute, in the context of a drug like Tracleer that sells over
$1.5 billion annually,302 it is disingenuous to imply that the refusal to sell
is sacrificing profits. The FTC’s argument relies on a de minimis
299. Creighton & Jacobson, supra note 127, at 54.
300. Id.
301. The FTC argued that a brand manufacturer’s “refusal to sell to generic rivals may
provide evidence of its willingness to sacrifice profitable sales.” FTC Actelion Brief, supra note
6, at 12. It continued that the “generic firms’ allegations that they would be willing to compensate
Actelion at full retail price support an inference, like in Aspen Skiing, that the refused sales would
have been profitable.” Id. at 13–14. Finally, the FTC concludes that Actelion’s “refus[al] to
provide access to its potential competitors, even if compensated at full retail price—support a
viable theory of exclusionary conduct.” Id. at 14.
302. See, e.g., Jim Edwards, Cialis Goes up Against Viagra in Hypertension Add-On War,
CBS MONEYWATCH (Aug. 18, 2009, 12:20 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/cialis-goes-upagainst-viagra-in-hypertension-add-on-war/.
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standard that yields ridiculous results—a woman who throws a cup of
water into the ocean and declares that there is now more water. The
argument is technically true, but the exchange does not represent a
significant sale or a major sacrifice of profits. The FTC even admits later
in its brief that this is merely “a one-time sale of a limited quantity.”303
Second, the determination of whether a certain sale constitutes
sacrificing profits includes more consideration than merely the single
transaction. In this case, the potential legal liability costs and the future
costs of almost certain patent litigation can all be considered part of the
costs of the sale of the drug. Both costs are substantial. As discussed
above, generic drug versions expose brand manufacturers to innovator
liability claims and common law negligence tort claims arising from
incorrectly prescribed or mislabeled generic drugs.304 This liability can
be massive and indicates that the costs associated with the sale of drug
samples are far steeper than the profits made off a single, one-time sale.
Another cost that must be included in the calculus of whether a sale is
profitable is the resulting Hatch–Waxman litigation over the filing of a
paragraph IV ANDA. By one measure, the average litigation costs of
patent infringement cases could exceed $6 million.305 Some may argue
that avoiding litigation costs of potential paragraph IV suits should not
be analyzed as a measure to avoid profit losses but rather avoiding
competition. Even ignoring potential paragraph IV suits, by any
measure, the anticipated litigation costs faced by brand manufacturers
forced to sell drug samples of REMS-restricted drugs are substantial.
When factoring in the costs of research and development associated with
creating a new drug and proceeding through the full NDA approval
process, one concludes that the sales of these drug samples to generic
manufacturers are not profitable and that no antitrust violation can be
established on the basis of sacrificed profits.
303. FTC Actelion Brief, supra note 6, at 15.
304. See supra notes 233–34 and accompanying text.
305. A 2009 survey by the American Intellectual Property Law Association estimated the
size of attorneys’ fees in U.S. patent litigation, finding that “where the amount in dispute [was]
between $1 million and $25 million, total litigation costs average in excess of $3 million.” See
William R. Towns, U.S. Contingency Fees—A Level Playing Field?, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG.
MAG. 3 (Feb. 2010), available at http://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/pdf/2010/
wipo_pub_121_2010_01.pdf. When the amount in dispute was higher than $25 million, the
average litigation costs were around $6 million. See id. When the amount in dispute was lower
than $1 million then often the costs of litigation exceeded the amount at stake. Id. at 4. Costs up
to the end of discovery usually exceeded 60% of the amount in controversy. Id. This study was
not specific to Hatch–Waxman pharmaceutical patent infringement cases, but, based on the size
of known settlements in reverse payment cases, it can be inferred that they are typically even
more costly than average patent litigation in the United States. It should not be controversial to
conclude that the litigation costs are substantial.
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Third, the patented products create the right to protect and exclude
others from the brand-name drugs. Indeed, the FTC does note that the
Hatch–Waxman Act exempts generic drug development from patent
infringement, but infringement is not the issue in this case.306 Just
because generic manufacturers can legally develop generics does not
mean that brand manufacturers have to be complicit in the development
of their own competition. Excluding others from the use of a patented
product is exactly what a patent allows—so long as that exclusion is not
solely for the purpose of harming competition.307 This right to exclude
is certainly not unqualified, and the question for antitrust purposes is to
ask why the exclusion is occurring. Theoretically, even under the profitsacrifice test, one could imagine a scenario where conduct could violate
the antitrust laws. As mentioned previously, however, there is already a
framework for oversight in place and any complaints about the
regulatory process should be directed to the Patent and Trademark
Office, the FDA, or Congress. Accordingly, following principles the
Court espoused in Credit Suisse,308 applying the profit-sacrifice test
ultimately does not weigh in favor of allowing antitrust liability in the
REMS context, and any predicate antitrust claims should be rejected.
B. The Courts Should Reject Alternative Theories for Single-Firm
Antitrust Liability
Alternative theories for section 2 liability include application of the
essential-facilities doctrine and encouraging the FTC to wield its section
5 authority to bring cases under unique theories of consumer harm. As
306. FTC Actelion Brief, supra note 6, at 5; see also 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2012). This has
become known as the Bolar Amendment, which states that it is not
an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell within the United States
or import into the United States a patented invention . . . solely for uses
reasonably related to the development and submission of information under a
Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary
biological products.
Id. In Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., the Supreme Court found that the Bolar Amendment is
notably confusing and that “[n]o interpretation we have been able to imagine can transform
§ 271(e)(1) into an elegant piece of statutory draftsmanship.” 496 U.S. 661, 679 (1990). Section
271(e)(2), however, “define[s] a new (and somewhat artificial) act of infringement for a very
limited and technical purpose that relates only to certain drug applications,” which means that
the filing of a paragraph IV certification can still be an infringement. Id. at 676.
307. See Darren S. Tucker et al, REMS: The Next Pharmaceutical Enforcement Priority?,
28 ANTITRUST 74, 78 (2014) (noting that liability for mere refusals to license will not interfere
with patent rights or antitrust protections).
308. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 285 (2007) (describing the
four prongs of the Gordon test).
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shown through discussion below, both approaches would lead to an
injurious and confusing antitrust policy while relying on antiquated
theories of consumer harm.
1. The Essential-Facilities Doctrine
Although the FTC opted out of commenting on the doctrine,309
generic manufacturers have argued that brand-name drug patents
represent an essential facility.310 This doctrine arises from a series of
district court cases, but the Supreme Court has neither adopted nor
completely repudiated the doctrine.311 The premise is that a monopolist
controls and can anticompetitively restrict the sole means of access to a
competitive market.312 The essential-facilities doctrine finds liability for
abuse of dominance where a monopolist holds a bottleneck control over
a mandatory or required input or resource—a “facility”—necessary for
market competition.313 That facility is usually in an upstream market and
the doctrine requires that the facility cannot be duplicated.314 The
doctrine states that in these circumstances the monopolist must share
access.315 The patented drug could be characterized as an essential
facility to competition in the pharmaceutical market for patients that
need the drug.
The essential-facilities doctrine has come under heavy scrutiny and
criticism.316 Professors Phillip E. Areeda and Herbert Hovenkamp
originally suggested six limiting principles for the doctrine317 and have
since concluded that “the essential facilit[ies] doctrine is both harmful

309. See, e.g., FTC Mylan Brief, supra note 6, at 9 n.23.
310. See, e.g., Tucker et al., supra note 307, at 74.
311. See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
410–11 (2004).
312. One court divided the doctrine into a four-part test. Advanced Health-Care Serv., Inc.
v. Radford Com. Hosp., 910 F.2d 139, 150 (4th Cir. 1990). The elements of the test included “(1)
control of the essential facility by a monopolist; (2) a competitor’s inability practically or
reasonably to duplicate the essential facility; (3) the denial of the use of the facility to a
competitor; and (4) the feasibility of providing the facility to competitors.” Id.
313. See Tucker et al, supra note 307, at 74, 81 n.49 (citing MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. AT&T
Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132 (7th Cir. 1983), superseded by statute, 47 U.S.C. § 152 (2012)).
314. See PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FUNDAMENTALS OF ANTITRUST LAW
§ 7.07[A], at 7-136–7-137 (4th ed. 2014).
315. See id. at 7-136.
316. See, e.g., Areeda, supra note 129, at 841 (“You will not find any case that provides a
consistent rationale for the doctrine or that explores the social costs and benefits or the
administrative costs of requiring the creator of an asset to share it with a rival. It is less a doctrine
than an epithet . . . .”).
317. Id. at 852 (“Compulsory access, if it exists at all, is and should be very exceptional.”).
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and unnecessary and should be abandoned.”318 The argument follows
that a preferable antitrust inquiry will take a sufficiently focused look at
the harms and benefits of an industry and the alleged anticompetitive
conduct, which would sufficiently incorporate any aspects of limited
access to a market. A separate essential-facilities doctrine is, thus, not
required to evaluate the antitrust claims in any case.
Even so, some application of the essential-facilities doctrine persists
in the district courts,319 which necessitates a discussion of its application.
The REMS-restricted drug patents should not qualify as essential
facilities and, even if they did, the decision to restrict access is not
anticompetitive under the remaining—albeit limited—essentialfacilities doctrine. There are three reasons for this conclusion. First,
although the drug patents can confer some level of monopoly power,
they are not essential facilities. This is because nothing is stopping
generic manufacturers from developing their own brand-name drug for
similar treatments to the drugs in question and undergoing the full NDA
process. This process would not require samples of the patented drugs
and, even if unlikely, would provide a path to future competition in the
same market. Simply because generic pharmaceuticals are unlikely to
take this path is irrelevant to the conclusion that a single patented drug
is not an essential facility to a competitive market, and that other avenues
exist to enter that market. Mere difficulty does not mean that a potential
rival has been anticompetitively excluded from a market if other means
of entry exist.320
Second, courts applying the essential-facilities doctrine have focused
intently on the competitive relationship between the parties. In
Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp.,321 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit held that “there must be a market in which plaintiff and
defendant compete, such that a monopolist extends its monopoly to the
downstream market. . . . Absent such a relevant market and competitive
relationship, the essential facility theory does not support a Sherman Act
violation.”322 In these cases, the generic manufacturers are not yet
competitors in the relevant market. Before becoming competitors, they
318. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 314, § 7.07[C], at 7-140 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
319. See Tucker et al., supra note 307, at 74.
320. See, e.g., Mid-South Grizzlies v. Nat’l Football League, 550 F. Supp. 558, 569–70
(E.D. Pa. 1982), aff’d, 720 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding where a non-professional football
team was excluded from membership in the only professional league, that the league was not an
essential facility because “[a]lthough not an easy task, plaintiffs are free to again attempt to form
a rival football league”). The court also noted that others had attempted this feat before, meaning
it was not infeasible. Id.
321. 195 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
322. Id.at 1357.
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would have to complete drug development, conduct bioequivalence
testing, receive FDA approval for their ANDA, file a paragraph IV
certification, and win a likely patent infringement suit. These are a large
number of incomplete intervening events to being considered a
competitor in the relevant market. At best, the generic manufacturers are
merely potential future competitors and absent a stronger showing of
exclusion, the essential-facilities doctrine cannot apply. Third, as
discussed above, valid business justifications exist for the conduct of the
brand manufacturers and insulate their decisions from scrutiny under the
essential-facilities doctrine.323
2. Section 5 of the FTC Act: Unfair Methods of Competition
The FTC is authorized under section 5 of the FTC Act to prosecute
conduct that utilizes “[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting
commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices.”324 Although the
history of section 5 has provided little explanation of the proper function
of this right, current FTC commissioners have issued proposed policy
statements seeking to elucidate the bounds of section 5.325 While these
proposed statements certainly do not constitute formal guidance from the
FTC, they provide some insight into how the agency conceptualizes its
section 5 authority. The argument has been made that section 5 should
be used to attack the brand manufacturers’ use of REMSs to exclude
generic competition.326 However, based on the recent FTC guidance on
section 5 and a sound approach to antitrust policy, these cases are not
dealt with correctly under the FTC’s section 5 authority. Additionally,
liability standards for “refusals to deal” in the REMS context have been
the subject of considerable thought and discussion by courts of appeals
and the Supreme Court; at least one court has declined to apply section
5 policy in this context.327
323. See supra Section III.B.
324. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012).
325. See, e.g., STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER JOSHUA D. WRIGHT, PROPOSED POLICY
STATEMENT REGARDING UNFAIR METHODS OF COMPETITION UNDER SECTION 5 OF THE FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION ACT, FED. TRADE COMM’N (June 19, 2013), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/wright/130619umcpolicystatement.pdf; see also Maureen K.
Ohlhausen, Section 5 of the FTC Act: Principles of Navigation, J. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 1
(2013), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/ohlhausen/131018section5.pdf.
326. See, e.g., David A. Balto, Can Antitrust Laws Prevent Abuse of FDA Risk Programs?,
LAW360 (Sept. 4, 2013, 12:36 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/468192 (“Section 5 can
play a particularly important role in health care markets. Assuming the likely unfairness
associated with brand-named manufacturers using REMS to prevent generic entry, the FTC
should apply Section 5 to future cases.”).
327. One circuit court noted that section 5 should not be used in areas where there is “wellforged” case law under the traditional antitrust laws because it might improperly blur the lines
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First, although section 5 does extend beyond the bounds of the
Sherman and Clayton Acts—as FTC Commissioner Joshua Wright has
written—“the act or practice in question must result in, or likely result
in, significant harm to competition as that term is understood under the
traditional federal antitrust laws”328 and the conduct “must not generate
cognizable efficiencies.”329 While this Article already addresses the
relevant antitrust claims under the Sherman Act, Commissioner Wright
points to two areas outside of traditional antitrust approaches that draw
section 5 scrutiny: (1) invitations to collude, and (2) “unfair methods of
competition to acquire market power that does not yet rise to the level of
monopoly power necessary for a violation of the Sherman Act.”330 Only
the latter example qualifies as a potential violation in the current REMS
cases. Accordingly, the following analysis is confined to a discussion of
potential anticompetitive harm and cognizable efficiencies.
A violation of section 5 can most easily be established with “evidence
that the challenged conduct has a harmful impact on price or output.”331
The likely competitive effects of a refusal to sell drug samples to generic
manufacturers have, at best, an ambiguous and unclear impact on output
and price. The FTC would likely point to evidence of lower prices when
generic competition occurs, but nearly all studies of post-generic entry
pharmaceutical markets also indicate that drug utilization and industry
output falls after generic entry.332 Any individual case would necessarily
be fact-based, but a situation where certain conduct leads to lower prices
and lower output could still have ambiguous competitive effects.
Commissioner Maureen Ohlhausen has emphasized the need to provide
clear guidance to businesses and the importance of reducing
uncertainty.333 Bringing a standalone section 5 case against conduct that
has vague competitive harm and has been approved by Supreme Court
precedent—the refusal-to-deal doctrine334—under a Sherman Act claim,
between what is legal and what is illegal. See Rybnicek, supra note 167, at 2 n.2 (citing Boise
Cascade Corp. v. FTC, 637 F.2d 573, 581–82 (9th Cir. 1980)); WRIGHT, supra note 325, at 6
(“At the same time, the Commission will not challenge conduct as an unfair method of
competition where there is well-forged case law under the traditional federal antitrust laws
because the Commission does not have an institutional advantage in discerning competitive
effects under such circumstances and prosecuting conduct under disparate standards may blur
the line between lawful and unlawful behavior.”).
328. WRIGHT, supra note 325, at 5.
329. Id. at 9.
330. Id. at 8.
331. Id. at 7.
332. See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
333. Ohlhausen, supra note 325, at 9 (“[T]he agency should provide clear guidance and
minimize the potential for uncertainty in the [unfair methods of competition] area.”).
334. See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
409 (2004) (noting that a refusal-to-deal case must fit within limited exceptions for the Court to
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does not provide clear antitrust guidance and risks chilling
procompetitive conduct.
Finally, the refusal to provide drug samples to generic manufacturers
raises cognizable efficiencies that insulate the behavior from
condemnation under section 5. Cognizable efficiencies occur when there
are
“benefits
that
enhance
consumer
welfare
[or
335
generate] . . . . significant welfare gains for consumers.” As discussed
previously, there are significant policy justifications for the refusal to
deal.336 It would be unprecedented for a court to take a step that
mandated cooperation with a competitor and also forced sharing of
dangerous drugs that would end up being administered to humans while
raising liability and potential health risks in consumers. The drugs
covered by ETASU raise substantial health risks that cannot be
adequately managed if generic versions are administered and the
regulatory environment of REMS has fostered uncertainty in the
marketplace that harms investment and research. Accordingly, these
cases are poor candidates for a section 5 claim and would expand liability
into an area previously untouched by antitrust, creating the very
uncertainty and lack of clarity that the FTC professes to eschew.
CONCLUSION
Despite the FTC’s endorsement of antitrust claims for refusals to deal
in the REMS context, antitrust law is not the solution to every dispute
that arises between businesses. Antitrust law seeks to encourage a
competitive market where firms are supposed to rigorously compete for
advantages and profits. Competition often appears, at first glance, as
predatory, exclusionary, or self-interested. That is exactly the situation
that has arisen in the Actelion, Lannett, and Mylan cases, and in other
examples of brand manufacturers refusing to provide samples of REMSrestricted drugs to generic manufacturers for bioequivalence testing.
Section 2 of the Sherman Act recognizes a strong right for dominant
firms to refuse to deal with their rivals. Any exceptions to this rule must
be well established in economic theory to benefit consumers, encourage
competition, and avoid error costs. This scenario does not represent a
good candidate for an exception to the right to refuse to deal. The effects
of a duty to deal would be uncertain, and substantial harm to innovation
and incentives for research and development would be at stake. The
pharmaceutical industry is heavily regulated and has complex goals and
statutory schemes. The proper remedy in this case comes from those bills
and regulations overseen by Congress and the FDA. Imposing antitrust
hold a party liable).
335. WRIGHT, supra note 325, at 11.
336. See supra Part II.
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liability would, instead, stifle competition and innovation. The FTC has
done little to aid this process by contorting antitrust law to reach the exact
opposite conclusion. Accordingly, district courts should be vigilant in
recognizing that these cases are not the proper medium for an
unprecedented expansion of section 2 antitrust liability.
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